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ABSTRACT 
 
Quality of Service (QoS) Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.  
(August 2005) 
Bin Lu, B.S.; M.S., Harbin Institute of Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Udo W. Pooch 
 
With the rapid proliferation of wireless networks and mobile computing applications, 
Quality of Service (QoS) for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) has received increased 
attention. Security is a critical aspect of QoS provisioning in the MANET environment. 
Without protection from a security mechanism, attacks on QoS signaling system could 
result in QoS routing malfunction, interference of resource reservation, or even failure of 
QoS provision.  
 
Due to the characteristics of the MANETs, such as rapid topology change and limited 
communication and computation capacity, the conventional security measures cannot be 
applied and new security techniques are necessary. However, little research has been 
done on this topic. In this dissertation, the security issues will be addressed for MANET 
QoS systems.  
 
The major contributions of this research are: (a) design of an authentication mechanism 
for ad hoc networks; (b) design of a security mechanism to prevent and detect attacks on 
the QoS signaling system; (c) design of an intrusion detection mechanism for bandwidth 
reservation to detect QoS attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. These three 
mechanisms are evaluated through simulation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
With the rapid proliferation of wireless networks and mobile computing applications, 
providing Quality of Service (QoS) in an efficient and scalable manner in mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) has become a topic of active research.  
 
MANETs are characterized by the absence of fixed infrastructure, rapid topology change 
and high node mobility. These characteristics can be used to determine that the 
guaranteed QoS proposed in wired networks cannot be directly applied to wireless ad 
hoc networks, because the communication capacity between any two nodes can be 
dramatically changed and this could result in breaking the previously promised QoS. 
Instead, soft QoS is provided in mobile ad hoc networks. Namely, each node in 
MANETs can provide only a promise not to deliberately oversubscribe itself and not to 
intentionally prevent resources from being available. 
 
Security is a critical issue and offers serious challenges in QoS provisioning in wireless 
ad hoc networks, and yet there is little work published in this area.  
 
Security mechanisms are utilized to preserve protected information and network 
resources, therefore can protect QoS from being tampered with by adversaries.  The 
security properties that should be supported in MANET QoS include availability, 
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. Availability refers to the requirement that the 
service offered by the node should be available to its users when expected. It is a 
primary security property ensuring soft QoS provision. Authenticity ensures the 
principals with whom one interacts are the expected nodes. Integrity enforces that a node 
or message transmitted has not been maliciously altered and confidentiality protects the 
secrecy of communication.  
1
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Malicious attacks on MANET QoS could target any and all of the above security 
properties and could be in forms of theft of service or denial of service (DoS), IP address 
spoofing, malicious corruption or alteration of packets, eavesdropping, etc.  
 
1.1. Why Security for QoS? 
 
The characteristics of ad hoc networks such as exposure to hostile environment (e.g. 
battle field, rescue missions) and difficulty of authentication exacerbate the QoS model 
security problems. Without protection of security mechanisms, a QoS model is 
vulnerable to both theft of service and denial of service, which inhibits the guarantee of 
network resource availability.  
 
A QoS model specifies an architecture in which some kinds of services could be 
provided. The objective is to implement a scalable, flexible and secure QoS model. Up 
to date, Integrated Services (IntServ) [1] and Differentiated Services (DiffServ or DS) 
[2] have been proposed to support QoS in the traditional Internet and are also being 
studied for MANET environments.  
 
The IntServ model provides an end-to-end QoS guarantee on a per-flow basis. It requires 
that every IntServ-enabled router keep the flow-specific states including bandwidth 
requirements, delay bound and cost of the flow, and therefore is not scalable for the 
Internet. DiffServ model is designed to overcome the scalability problem in the IntServ 
for wired networks. The DiffServ model is based on flow aggregation by classifying 
packets into a limited number of classes and then applying specific forwarding treatment 
to each QoS class.  
 
Flexible QoS Model for MANETs (FQMM) [3] is a model proposed solely for mobile ad 
hoc networks. The FQMM takes the characteristics of MANETs into account and is a 
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hybrid provisioning scheme of the per-flow service in IntServ and the per-class service 
in DiffServ. 
 
Although Diffserv model provides more scalability and greater flexibility than the 
Intserv model, several vulnerabilities in DiffServ for MANETs make it a less secure 
model than the IntServ.  
 
This research attempts to design a security system to protect the IntServ architecture for 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
Targeting IntServ model in MANETs, adversaries could issue attacks in the following 
ways:  
 
• A malicious node can tamper QoS provision with falsified data or QoS signaling 
messages to steal or deplete resources used or reserved by other nodes. 
 
• Attacks on QoS signaling system such as malicious alteration of the QoS 
parameters in QoS signaling messages. This form of attack could result in 
incorrect QoS reservation along a path and therefore lead to degradation of 
network resources utilization or legitimate traffic penalization.  
 
• Advertisement of false network resource information. In MANETs, the network 
resource information is inaccurate. However, deliberately advertising false 
information is more dangerous because it will result in incorrect routing and QoS 
reservation and thus also degradation of network resources utilization or 
legitimate traffic penalization.  
 
• Maliciously drop, delay or corrupt data packets, resulting in deliberately 
violating promised QoS. 
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Therefore, security mechanisms are needed to prevent QoS systems from being 
maliciously attacked.  
 
1.2. Contributions of This Research 
 
The objective of this research is to provide security protection and intrusion detection 
mechanisms to prevent from or to detect malicious attacks. We concentrate on 
authentication approaches, secure QoS signaling systems, and intrusion detection for 
bandwidth reservation in MANETs. Considering these goals of MANET QoS security, 
the contributions of this research include: 
 
1) Design a lightweight authentication protocol that can provide integrity and 
authenticity to neighboring communications in QoS-enabled networks. 
 
Most ad hoc networks do not employ any network access control, leaving them 
vulnerable to resource consumption attacks. In QoS-enabled ad hoc networks, users need 
to assure that the party who sent a message is indeed the legitimate party. Otherwise, a 
malicious node can tamper a network and QoS provision with falsified data and QoS 
signaling messages to steal or deplete resources used or reserved by other nodes. To deal 
with these attacks, an authentication protocol needs to be in place to ensure that a packet 
is sent by an authentic and legitimate node. 
 
In this dissertation, we will propose a lightweight authentication protocol that effectively 
and efficiently provides security properties such as authenticity and integrity for 
communicating nodes in MANETs. The protocol not only eliminates the high 
performance overhead imposed by asymmetric cryptography (such as digital signatures), 
but also avoids the difficulty of key management introduced by secret paired symmetric 
key. The authentication protocol is proved to be lightweight, scalable and tolerant of 
packet loss.  
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2) Build an Intrusion Prevention mechanism and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
to prevent and detect attacks on QoS signaling.  
 
The vulnerabilities and types of security violations will be analyzed for MANET QoS 
models, which include IntServ model, Diffserv model and the Flexible QoS Model for 
MANETs. The analysis demonstrated that DiffServ and FQMM are vulnerable to attacks 
such as theft and depletion of network resources. Compared to the DiffServ model, the 
IntServ approach does not have the security risks mentioned above because it is based on 
flows rather than on aggregated traffic as in DiffServ and FQMM. However, IntServ 
model requires a signaling system to achieve QoS provision along a data path.  
 
QoS signaling is used to search for routes with sufficient resources for desired QoS, to 
reserve and release resources, to set up, tear down and renegotiate flows. Without 
protection from a security mechanism, attacks on QoS signaling system could result in 
QoS routing malfunction, interference of resource reservation, or even failure of QoS 
provision. Current approaches proposed for intrusion detection and security prevention 
on QoS signaling in wired networks (such as SDS/CD and RSVP-SQOS) cannot be 
applied to ad hoc QoS signaling systems due to various reasons. 
 
Part of this research is to develop an intrusion prevention mechanism as well as a set of 
rules that can be used to effectively and efficiently detect attacks on QoS signaling 
(bandwidth, delay or jitter parameters) in mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
This mechanism is aimed at meeting the following security requirements: 
 
• QoS parameters delivered in signaling messages can be classified as non-
mutable parameters (such as requested bandwidth, delay or jitter) and mutable 
parameters (such as those used to measure available bandwidth or delay along 
the path). An integrity protection mechanism should be in place to guarantee 
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that the non-mutable part in the QoS object, such as the QoS profiles for traffic 
flows, is not changed illegally. 
 
• QoS states collected over the path (e.g. available bandwidth and accumulative 
delay over a path) should be resistant to attacks, which are stored in mutable 
QoS parameters. The malicious attacks on these parameters are more deceiving 
than those on non-mutable ones because they cannot be detected via integrity 
verification. 
 
3) Build an Intrusion Detection System to detect attacks on bandwidth reservation in 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
In the traditional network, once resources are successfully reserved along a path, the 
QoS is expected to be guaranteed. Breaking the bandwidth reservation is unusual and 
thus can be considered as presence of malicious attacks. The case is different in ad hoc 
networks because there is only soft QoS, which means a node will not intentionally or 
knowingly oversubscribe itself to make the resource unavailable to the traffic after 
resource reservation. Therefore the QoS is not guaranteed but only promised and nodes 
are allowed to break the promise in case of abrupt resource changes due to mobility, 
wireless interference or the node being shut down. Adversaries could take advantage of 
this characteristic and issue an attack by means of pretending to reserve the resource 
while break the promise afterwards. It can lead to excessive overhead to the traffic and 
degradation of network performance. 
 
In MANETs, a break of QoS promise can result from malicious attacks as well as radio 
interference from the nodes who just “wandered” into the neighborhood unaware of the 
reservation. Moreover, communication links in MANETs are open medium and 
therefore subject to radio interference. Detection of intrusion on bandwidth reservation 
needs to distinguish these cases and apparently is not a trivial task.  
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An algorithm is proposed in this dissertation to detect both DoS attacks (issued by 
malicious nodes in the neighborhood to disrupt the service), and QoS attacks (issued by 
relay node on the path to disrupt the service or to steal the bandwidth).  
 
The performance of the proposed security mechanisms are evaluated through simulation. 
 
1.3. Outline 
 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the related work in QoS 
issues and security issues in mobile networks. In this chapter, we also give a brief 
introduction on QoS security problems in both the traditional Internet and wireless 
networks.  In Chapter III, we will propose a lightweight authentication protocol that can 
be used to protect neighboring communications in mobile ad hoc networks. We first 
describe the assumptions used for the design. Then we will introduce the trust 
management and the message authentication schemes. The security properties and the 
performance evaluation from simulation will be demonstrated too. This authentication 
protocol will be used to protect the authentication and integrity of QoS signaling system 
which will be addressed in Chapter IV. Chapter IV studies the security problems for QoS 
systems in MANETs. The security vulnerabilities in each QoS model (such as IntServ, 
DiffServ and FQMM) will be analyzed first. Secondly, we will propose a security 
mechanism for QoS signaling system. Simulation results will be showed at last. In 
Chapter V, we will propose an intrusion detection mechanism for bandwidth reservation 
in MANETs. The attack models for bandwidth reservation will be described and then the 
detection scheme will be introduced. Chapter VI will conclude the work and discuss 
about future work.  
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2. RELATED WORK 
 
The characteristics of MANETs determine that providing QoS in MANETs is different 
from that in the traditional Internet. Each node in MANETs can provide only a promise 
not to deliberately oversubscribe itself and not to intentionally prevent resources from 
being available [4], which introduces difficulty in providing security properties to QoS 
in MANETs.  
 
 The security properties that should be supported in MANET QoS include availability, 
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality [5]. More specifically, the QoS security 
problems to be solved are as follows: [6] 
 
• Protection of crucial Quality of Application (QoA) parameters during connection 
setup. The protection is at the control level. 
• Protection of data packets during their transmission in a timely manner. This 
protection is at the data level. 
• Protection against denial of service attacks. 
 
Authentication, access control, encryption, denial-of-access-sensitive admission control 
should be enforced during the QoS connection setup to distribute the QoS requirements 
and provide proper resource reservation, allocation and access in a secure fashion. If 
security mechanisms and policies at routers, gateways and firewalls, such as intrusion 
detection, digital signature and encryption with variable key lengths, scalable key 
management, watermarking, security policy management are available, this could 
provide for a secure transmission path, content protection and end-to-end QoS provision. 
 
Up to date, a great amount of research has been done in the study of QoS in MANETs, 
security in MANETs and QoS security in conventional networks. However, as of our 
knowledge, there is yet little work published on the topic of QoS security for MANETs.  
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2.1.  QoS in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
 
The characteristics of Quality of Service in MANETs significantly affect the QoS 
architecture and routing protocols employed in MANETs, which are as follows: 
 
• There is no core and edge distinction. All the nodes are homogenous in QoS 
provision roles. Due to the fact of mobility and absence of a fixed infrastructure, 
a node can serve as a core node at one time and an edge node at another time.  
• The link between two nodes is a shared medium instead of a point-to-point link 
as in wired networks. Because of the open medium feature, a node in a mobile ad 
hoc network can have interference from the neighboring nodes in packet 
transmission.  
• High node mobility results in guaranteed QoS proposed in wired networks not 
applicable to MANET QoS any more. Previously promised QoS can be broken 
when the communication capacity between two nodes dramatically change. 
Therefore, each node in MANETs can provide only a promise not to deliberately 
oversubscribe itself and not to intentionally prevent resources from being 
available [4]. 
• The communication capacity between nodes is low. The link bandwidth is within 
the range of 1Mbps to 11Mbps, which is less than that in the traditional 
networks. However, the scalability problem of the Internet IntServ model is less 
likely to occur in the current MANETs in consideration of the small number of 
traffic flows and the limited size of the network [7].  
 
2.1.1. QoS signaling systems in mobile ad hoc networks 
 
The IntServ model provides an end-to-end QoS guarantee on a per-flow basis. RSVP is a 
signaling protocol for resource reservation in IntServ model for wired networks, which 
allow some users to access to preferential networking resources . Permission to make a 
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reservation will depend both on the availability of the requested resources along the path 
of the data, and on satisfaction of policy rules. 
 
The approach of making advance reservations to obtain a quality of service that is not 
affected by mobility for a mobile host is employed along the data flow paths to and from 
the locations it may visit during the lifetime of the connection. The mobile host can be a 
sender in a flow, a receiver in a flow or both sender and receiver in the same flow 
simultaneously. Other than these, the reservation model of RSVP is used.  
 
Two approaches have been proposed to solve the mobile RSVP problem: Mobile RSVP 
(MRSVP) [8] and Hierarchical Mobile RSVP (HMRSVP) [9].  
 
Both protocols employ active and passive reservations. For a mobile sender, it makes an 
active reservation from the current location of the mobile host and it makes passive 
reservations from the other locations listed in its MSPEC. To improve the utilization of 
mobile links, the bandwidth with passive reservations of a flow can be used by other 
flows requesting weaker QoS or best-effort services until the passive reservations 
become active. Two approaches were proposed to handle the active and passive 
messages in MRSVP. In the first approach, the proxy agents play a more important role 
in processing active and passive messages and no other nodes besides the proxy agents 
and mobile hosts are involved in the RSVP message processing and forwarding rules. 
The second approach uses some additional objects in RSVP message and extends the 
RSVP processing and forwarding rules at all nodes, which however ensures better 
utilization of network resources. 
 
HMRSVP is based on MRSVP but HMRSVP makes advance resource reservations only 
when an inter-region movement may possibly happen. The simulation models and 
results are also demonstrated to show that HMRSVP can achieve the same QoS 
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guarantees as MRSVP with fewer resource reservations. 
 
INSIGNIA signaling system is an in-band signaling system specifically designed to 
deliver adaptive real-time service in MANETs [10]. The term “in-band signaling” refers 
to the fact that control information is carried along with data flows; while “out-of-band 
signaling” indicates the control information is carried in separate control packets and 
channels distinct from the data path. Based on the in-band approach, the INSIGNIA can 
restore a reservation in response to topology changes within the interval of two 
consecutive IP packets under ideal conditions. INSIGNIA performance relies on the 
speed at which the routing protocol can recompute new routes if no alternative route is 
cached after topology changes. In the ideal case where cached alternative routes are 
available, restoration of resource reservation can be made as quickly as the period 
between two consecutive packets associated with a session as long as sufficient 
resources are available along the new path. In contrast, out-of-band signaling systems, 
for example, would need to maintain source route information and respond to topology 
changes by directly signaling intermediate routers on an old path to allocate/free radio 
resources. This is impossible in many cases if the affected router is out of radio contact 
from the signaling entity that attempts to de-allocate resources over the old path. 
Therefore, INSIGNIA is a lightweight signaling system in terms of the amount of 
bandwidth consumed for network control and capable of fast flow reservation, 
restoration and adaptation 
 
Charles Perkins et. al. proposed a QoS signaling system for Ad hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) routing in MANETs [11]. In their draft, extensions are added to the 
route discovery packets, specifying the service requirements that must be met by nodes 
re-broadcasting a Route Request (RREQ) or returning a Route Reply (RREP) for a 
destination. Specifically, a QoS Object extension provides the QoS flow profile, 
including delay and jitter parameters. A Maximum Permissible Delay (or Jitter) 
extension is also included in AODV in order to enable accumulated measurement for 
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end-to-end delay (or jitter). An intermediate node will generated an ICMP QOS_LOST 
message if it experiences a significant change in its ability to keep the QoS promises it 
has made to the source of the flows.  
 
D. A. Maltz argued that the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol should be used for 
resource reservations for mobile ad hoc networks because his simulation studies showed 
that DSR had “by far the lowest overhead in terms of routing packets sent among the 
current set of routing protocols for ad hoc networks” [4]. The two mechanisms – path-
state and flow-state are used to explicitly manage resources in ad hoc networks. Path-
state allows intermediate nodes to forward packets according to a predetermined source 
route. The originator of each data packet initially includes both a source route and a 
unique path identifier for the route in each packet it sends. As intermediate nodes 
forward the packet, they cache the source route from the packet and record the according 
path identifier. Then the source can send subsequent packets carrying only the path 
identifier, and intermediate nodes forward the packet based on the source route for the 
path indexed by the path identifier that they have cached. Flow-state allows a source to 
differentiate its traffic into flows, and therefore to request better-than-best-effort 
handling for these flows. With the additional information provided by the flow-state, the 
network will be able to provide admission control and promise a specific Quality of 
Service (QoS) to each flow. Since the ad hoc network may frequently change topology, 
the flow-state mechanisms are directly integrated into the routing protocol to minimize 
their reaction time and to provide notifications to a flow when the network must break its 
promise for a specific level of QoS.  
 
2.1.2. QoS routing in mobile ad hoc networks 
 
Due to the fact that network resources are very limited in MANETs, QoS routing is 
achieved with constraints on bandwidth, delay, jitter, packet loss rate and route stability. 
The characteristics of MANETs also determine the challenges in ad hoc QoS routing: 
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• The link capacity is time-varying, which makes admission control difficult. 
• Resource reservation is not stable, because the availability of the reserved 
bandwidth over shared medium is not guaranteed. As mentioned before, the 
communication capacity between nodes can dramatically change, which may 
result in QoS re-routing or routing recovery. 
• Once a route fails, failure detection and recovery is required. 
• End-to-end delay guarantee is not hard in an unsynchronized network.  
 
T. Chen gives a comprehensive description on the problem and current algorithms of 
QoS routing in ad hoc wireless networks in his Ph.D. dissertation [12]. The defects of 
the existing routing algorithms are analyzed in the thesis, which include the inability of 
meeting the requirements of ad hoc wireless networks (such as high accuracy, low 
overhead, scalability in a large network, the possibility of providing QoS routing etc). 
The Global State Routing (GSR) approach is proposed. The GSR maintains a global 
view of network topology and optimizes their routing decisions locally based on the link 
state vectors exchanged among the neighbor nodes during exchange of routing 
information. The exchange frequency of link state vectors depends on the node’s 
distance to destination. This multi-level fisheye scope scheme keeps the control message 
small and therefore reduces the consumption of bandwidth by control overhead. 
 
C. Lin et al. proposed a bandwidth routing protocol for QoS support in a multi-hop 
mobile network [13]. The protocol contains end-to-end bandwidth calculation and 
allocation. The source is aware of the bandwidth and QoS available to all the 
destinations in the mobile network. This knowledge enables the establishment of QoS 
connections within the mobile network and the efficient support of real time 
applications. The case of ATM interconnection is also discussed in the paper. 
 
A distributed QoS routing scheme is proposed in [14]. In the proposed algorithms, 
multiple paths are searched in parallel to find the best qualified, which is called “ticket-
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based probing”. The advantageous properties of the ticket-based probing include 
dynamic tradeoff between the overhead and the routing performance; working with 
imprecise state information; avoiding any centralized path computation that could be 
very expensive for QoS routing in large networks; and the local and end-to-end states 
maintained at the intermediate nodes can be collectively used to direct the probes along 
the low-cost feasible paths toward the destination. Fault-tolerance techniques are 
employed in the scheme for the maintenance of the routing paths resulted from changes 
of network topology, which enable the proposed algorithms to tolerate high information 
imprecision. To improve the overall network utilization performance, a heuristic 
algorithm is proposed for the NP-complete delay-constrained and least-cost routing 
problem. The algorithm considers QoS constraints as well as cost optimality of the 
routing path. The simulation results showed that the algorithms achieved a high call-
admission ratio, low-cost paths and a modest routing overhead. 
 
Ad hoc QoS On-demand routing (AQOR) [15] is a resource reservation-based routing 
and signaling algorithm that provides end-to-end QoS support. AQOR includes the 
following QoS support features: (1) accurate measurement of bandwidth availability in 
the shared wireless channel and accurate measurement of effective end-to-end delay in 
an unsynchronized environment, (2) distributed routing algorithm that adapts with the 
dynamic environment, (3) resource reservation that guarantees the available resources, 
(4) efficient resource release upon route adjustment, (5) instant QoS violation detection 
and (6) fast and efficient route recovery. AQOR integrates on-demand route discovery 
between the source and destination; signaling functions for resource reservation and 
maintenance; and hop-by-hop routing. It introduces a detailed computation of available 
bandwidth and end-to-end delay.  In traffic estimation and bandwidth availability, it 
considers both self traffic and neighbor traffic to reduce the hidden-node effect, which 
means that some bandwidth reserved at a certain node is for the traffic between 
neighboring nodes. AQOR estimates end-to-end downlink delay by measuring round trip 
delay. AQOR achieves adaptive routing by detecting QoS violations at the destination 
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node or intermediate nodes. Two types of QoS violations are considered in the protocol: 
(1) channel deterioration in one of the links of the active route, which is an end-to-end 
delay and detected at destination; (2) route break, which may be cause by left of some 
node on the active route. This violation can be detected through bandwidth reservation 
timeout at the destination, or MAC retransmission failure at some intermediate node on 
the route. The routing adjustment overhead is reduced by employing destination-
initiated recovery. 
 
CEDAR, a Core-Extraction Distributed Ad hoc Routing algorithm for QoS routing in a 
small to medium size ad hoc network is proposed in [16].CEDAR dynamically 
establishes “a core of the network, and then incrementally propagates the link state of 
stable high bandwidth links to the nodes of the core. Route computation is on demand, 
and is performed by core nodes using only local state.” CEDAR has three main 
components:  
 
• The establishment and maintenance of a self-organizing routing infrastructure 
called the core for performing route computations, which is also called core-
extraction. A set of nodes are selected distributedly and dynamically to develop 
the core of the network. In this process, a minimum dominating set of the ad hoc 
network is estimated using only local computation and local state. Each core 
node maintains the local topology of the nodes in its domain, and also performs 
route computation on behalf of these nodes. 
 
• The propagation of the link-state of high-bandwidth and stable links in the core 
through increase/decrease waves, which is also called Link state propagation. 
QoS routing in CEDAR is achieved by propagating the bandwidth availability 
information of stable links in the core that is known to nodes far away in the 
network, while information about dynamic links or low bandwidth links is kept 
local. Slow-moving increase-waves and fast-moving decrease-waves, which 
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denote corresponding changes in available bandwidth on links, are used to 
propagate non-local information over core nodes. 
 
• A QoS route computation algorithm that is executed at the core nodes using only 
locally available state, which is also called Route computation. Route 
computation first establishes a core-path from the dominator (core in the domain) 
of the source to the dominator of the destination. The core path provides the 
directional information of the route from the source to the destination. Using this 
directional information, CEDAR iteratively tries to find a partial route from the 
source to the domain of the furthest possible node in the core path (which then 
becomes the source for the next iteration) satisfying the requested bandwidth, 
using only local information. Effectively, the computed route is a shortest-
widest-furthest path using the core path as the guideline. 
 
The advantages of CEDAR include the facts that route discovery or maintenance duties 
are limited to a small number of core nodes, and link state propagation is a function of 
link stability or quality. The disadvantages of CEDAR are: core nodes have to handle 
additional traffic, which are associated with route discovery and maintenance; and it is 
hard to converge under high mobility. 
 
2.2. Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks are characterized by the absence of fixed infrastructure, rapid 
topology change and high node mobility. These characteristics determine that wireless 
ad hoc network is more vulnerable to malicious attacks than the traditional Internet. The 
vulnerabilities are mainly caused by the following reasons [17]: 
 
• The use of wireless links makes the network susceptible to attacks ranging from 
passive eavesdropping to active interfering. It’s not like what is in traditional 
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wired networks that attackers have to physically access the wires or get through 
several defense lines at firewalls or gateways.  
 
• Mobile nodes able to roam independently makes them easier to be captured, 
compromised and hijacked. Since tracking down a particular mobile node in a 
large-scale ad hoc network could be hard, attacks by a compromised node from 
within the network are far more damaging and much harder to detect. Creating 
and maintaining trust among peer nodes is also difficult and thus Byzantine 
failure should be prevented. 
 
• Due to lack of centralized mechanisms in ad hoc network and many algorithms 
rely on the cooperative participation of all nodes, adversaries can exploit this 
vulnerability for new types of attacks designed to break the cooperative 
algorithms. 
 
• Most ad hoc routing algorithms are also cooperative in nature, which is unlike 
with a wired network, where extra protection can be placed on routers and 
gateways. Therefore, a compromised node could paralyze the entire wireless 
network by disseminating false routing information. 
 
Due to these characteristics, the mobile ad hoc networks have harder security 
requirements than the traditional, wired and static Internet. One of the most severe 
threats to the routing in ad hoc networks is attack from compromised nodes, which could 
exert unpredictable and undetectable Byzantine failures .  
 
2.2.1. Routing and network-layer security 
 
MANET routing protocols can be categorized into proactive, reactive and hybrid. 
Proactive schemes try to keep up to date with the topology and routing information in 
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the network. This achieves low latencies and good routes, since the best path, according 
to the protocol's metric, should always be known when the node wishes to send a packet. 
However, it also results in high overhead because the information may change 
frequently. 
 
Therefore, this can be difficult and expensive for mobile ad hoc networks. Traditional 
link-state and distance-vector routing protocols are all proactive. MANET proactive 
routing protocols include DSDV [18], OLSR [19] and etc. Reactive schemes only 
discover routing information as it is needed, or on-demand. This greatly reduces the 
routing overhead incurred by proactive protocols at the expense of higher latencies, 
when routes to a requested destination must be discovered before packets can be sent. It 
can also cause longer routes, since reactive schemes will continue to use an established 
route as long there are no errors, even if a shorter route appears later due to changes in 
the topology. MANET proactive routing protocols include AODV [20], DSR [21], 
TORA [22] and etc. Hybrid schemes, such as ZRP [23], CEDAR [16], and etc., use 
constrained link state maintenance. The routes are also established on demand. Hybrid 
scheme is proposed in consideration that since ad-hoc network can exhibit quite a range 
of topology behavior, routing schemes could adapt to a current state of the network, pre-
computing routes when mobility is low, and waiting for send requests to initiate route 
discovery when mobility is high.  
 
A set of design techniques for intrusion-resistant ad hoc routing algorithms are proposed 
in [24] to protect ad hoc networks against denial of service attacks. These techniques are 
routing algorithm independent principles that can be incorporated into a number of 
existing ad hoc routing algorithms to make them robust and resistant to malicious 
intrusions. The mechanisms aim to limit the damage from intrusion attacks and to allow 
for continued network operation at an acceptable level during the attacks. The proposed 
techniques include: flow-based route access control (FRAC), which is used to restrict 
data traffic passing through a router to authorized flows by means of maintaining an 
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access control rule base at each router that defines the list of authorized flows allowed to 
be forwarded by the router; multi-path routing, which refers to the ability of ad hoc 
routing algorithms to discover and maintain all legitimate routes for a data flow; source-
initiated flow routing, allowing the source to specify which of the multiple paths 
between the source and the destination will be used; flow-monitoring, which enables the 
detection of path failures resulting from a various types of intrusion attacks (such as data 
flow disruption attack and resource depletion attack); fast authentication, a lightweight 
mechanism for authenticating data packets flowing through a wireless router that relies 
on placing the path label of a packet at a node specific secret location within the packet; 
sequence numbers, which counters replay attacks; and referral-based resource 
allocation, to prevent from colluding attacks. 
 
A new routing protocol Ariadne [25] is introduced based on unoptimized DSR, which 
aims to address routing security. The security mechanism is to protect against wormhole 
attacks, in which two colluding nodes establish “a private, possibly out-of-band, 
channel” between them and modify routes to go through this link or secretly forward 
information over it. Adversary model is also proposed based on the number of 
adversaries and whether they possess cryptographic keys (Byzantine failures) or not. The 
authors note that most other protocols simply require a single MAC-layer key, which 
gives no protection against Byzantine failures. Therefore Ariadne requires each pair of 
nodes to share a unique pre-distributed secret. This secret seeds a PRNG that generates 
directional confidentiality and integrity keys between each pair. Even though 
confidentiality keys are set up, they are not explicitly used in the Ariadne protocol. The 
protocol relies on the integrity/authentication keys and the TESLA authentication 
scheme, which is proposed by Perrig et al. [25]. Messages are sent with authentication 
codes under the TESLA keys, which are generated from a reversed one-way hash chain. 
Each key is valid for a certain period of time and is disclosed only after the time period 
is finished and the key is invalid.  
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Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks [26] (ARAN) is more an authentication 
scheme than a routing protocol. It depends on public key certificates and trusted 
common certificate authorities to provide authentication for routing process. It roughly 
defines a path discovery method, but does not specify how routing information is kept in 
the packets not at the nodes. ARAN defines two levels of authentication, an end-to-end 
authentication service which includes hop-by-hop authentication for only the current 
hop; and an all-to-end authentication service (Shortest Path Confirmation), in which all 
hop-by-hop authentications are preserved and the packets are also re-encrypted under the 
destination's public key. In both cases the relevant certificates are included in the packet; 
two certificates for the end-to-end case, n for the all-to-end case, where n is the number 
of nodes the packet has visited. Due to the fact that certificates are often large, both 
methods are quite expensive for energy constrained devices, as are often found in ad-hoc 
networks. 
 
To combat the problem of the heavyweight cryptographic requirements in ARAN 
protocol, LARAN (Lightweighted Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks) is 
proposed . LARAN uses lightweight cryptography via one-way hash chains to achieve 
“nearly double the performance of ARAN with only minor impact upon security 
considerations”. Due to the use of one-way hash chains for authentication, the LARAN 
protocol requires that “a packet sent by a node is received by a neighboring node before 
a third node can replay the packet to it, unless the neighbor under consideration has 
dropped the packet”. Analysis is also provided to address the security solutions against 
attacks that introduced when attempting to move to lightweight hash-chain based 
security. These attacks are: Bootstrap replay attack, FAIL message flooding attack, node 
movement attack, tunneling bootstrap attack, and jamming attack. 
 
Hop-by-hop authentication is a widely used security mechanism in the traditional 
Internet for protecting such features as integrity, confidentiality and nonrepudiation. The 
Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (SAODV) [27] is an extension of 
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the AODV [20] routing protocol that exploits hop-by-hop authentication to protect the 
route discovery mechanism providing these security characteristics. SAODV requires all 
intermediate nodes cryptographically validate the digital signature appended with the 
routing messages and consequently imposes a high overhead on routing process.  
 
Hop-by-hop authentication is neither efficient nor effective due to its extensive overhead 
as well as the fact that authentication can only identify a node but can not determine 
whether the information distributed by the node is correct. A malicious node inside the 
network could raise false alarms or send false link state information, which would result 
in other nodes being wronged or the network paralyzed. Deliberate distribution of false 
information could be far more damaging and much harder to detect than other forms of 
attacks.  
 
To battle the high process overhead in SAODV, the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) for 
ad hoc networks was proposed by Papadimitratos and Haas [28]. SRP assumes only the 
source and destination nodes are trusted and thus securely associated, which removes the 
overhead on intermediate nodes. The protocol guarantees that fabricated, compromised, 
or replayed route replies would either be rejected or never reach back to the querying 
node. SRP achieves robustness in the presence of noncolluding nodes, and provides 
accurate routing information in a timely manner.  
 
SEAD (Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distant vector routing protocol) is a secure ad hoc 
routing protocol based on the design of the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector 
routing protocol (DSDV) [29]. One-way hash functions instead of asymmetric 
cryptographic operations are used in the protocol in order to support use with nodes of 
limited CPU processing capability, and to guard against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks 
in which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess network 
bandwidth or processing time. The simulation results showed that SEAD is robust with 
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presence of multiple noncolluding attackers creating incorrect routing state in any other 
node. 
 
While Quality of Service (QoS) is being regarded as another critical service other than 
security in ad hoc networks, researchers are trying to take advantage of both mechanisms 
by embedding one into the other. [30] presents a Security-Aware Ad Hoc Routing (SAR) 
protocol that incorporates security attributes as parameters into ad hoc route discovery. 
SAR employs the idea of “quality of security” and ensures data are routed through a 
secure path only composed of nodes at the same trust level. The authors suggested to 
simply mirror organizational privileges in trust level establishment and to encrypt the 
portion of the RREQ and RREP headers that contain the trust level. The desirable 
security properties associated with the “level of protection” include timeliness, ordering, 
authenticity, authorization, integrity, confidentiality and nonrepudiation. While routing 
through a set of trusted nodes guarantees greater security, it is not always feasible to find 
a path that only includes nodes at the desired trust level. 
 
With these remarkable probes, it has been proved extremely difficult to find a panacea 
achieving both effectiveness and efficiency for ad hoc routing security. All approaches 
have to make a tradeoff between these two performances. 
 
A network-layer security solution in ad hoc networks is described in [31], which protects 
both routing and data packet forwarding functionalities in the context of the AODV 
protocol. The proposed self-organization approach employs a “full-localized” design, 
which does not assume any priori trust or secret association between nodes. In the 
design, each node has a token to be temporarily admitted to the network, which will 
expire and has to be renewed. The period of the validity of a node’s token is dependent 
on how long it has stayed and behaved well in the network. The behavior of the node is 
monitored collaboratively by its local neighbors, and any misbehavior in routing or 
packet forwarding services will be detected. To improve the monitoring accuracy and 
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withstand the blackmail attack, ‘m out of N’ strategy is used to cross-validate the 
monitoring results of different nodes in the neighborhood. 
 
The advantages of this “full-localized” design include: the local information is more 
credible than that from the remote hosts because, therefore the detection accuracy of the 
security mechanisms that use local information should be higher than those using remote 
information; Secondly, “full-localized” approach removes the necessities of propagating 
security information between detecting nodes with multi-hop distance and therefore 
reduces network traffic. The disadvantages of the design are: the detection is only 
effective within the neighborhood and therefore does not perform well in presence of 
mobile attackers; the audit data is limited to local information; and overhearing the 
channels could be unreliable in some circumstances and consequently the detection is 
prone to attacks on data-link channels. 
 
A new mechanism, called packet leashes, is presented in [32] for detecting and 
defending against wormhole attacks. Wormhole is a severe attack in ad hoc networks 
that is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any nodes, and even if all 
communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an 
attacker records packets at one location in the network, and then tunnels them to another 
location, and retransmits them there into the network. Because the wormhole attack is 
particularly dangerous against many ad hoc network routing protocols in which the 
nodes that hear a packet transmission directly from some node consider themselves to be 
in range of (and thus a neighbor of) that node, it is important for a node to know how  far 
it is away from the sending node. Two kinds of leashes are proposed: 
 
• Geographical leash, in which each node must know its own location and all 
nodes must have loosely synchronized clocks. When sending a packet, the 
sending node includes in the packet its own location, and the time at which it sent 
the packet; when receiving a packet, the receiving node compares these values to 
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its own location, and the time at which it received the packet. The receiver can 
compute an upper bound on the distance between the sender and itself. 
 
• Temporal leash, in which all nodes must have tightly synchronized clocks, such 
that maximum difference between any two nodes' clocks is . The value of the 
parameter must be known by all nodes in the network, To use temporal leashes, 
when sending a packet, the sending node includes in the packet the time at which 
it sent the packet; when receiving a packet, the receiving node compares this 
value to the time at which it received the packet. The receiver is then able to 
detect if the packet traveled too far, based on the claimed transmission time and 
the speed of light. 
 
A specific protocol, called TIK, which implements leashes is also presented in the work. 
 
AODV protocol can be vulnerable to impersonation attacks [33]. A malicious node can 
issue in-the-middle attack, to hijack the traffic from node A and then communicates with 
A while pretending to be node B, which is the real destination of node A’s traffic. The 
authors point out that the classic approaches where public key cryptography can not be 
applied in mobile ad hoc networks due to the fact that a central authority is not available. 
Instead, this approach uses Cryptographically Generated Identifiers and Addresses that 
are derived from the hash of the node’s public key, which are “statistically unique” and 
“securely bound to a given node”. Therefore, it allows two hosts A and B to establish a 
secure channel over an insecure ad hoc network that uses AODV. 
 
2.2.2. Intrusion detection architectures 
 
Generally, an Intrusion Detection System can be classified based on the detection 
technique as described below: 
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• Signature-based (or misuse) detection monitors for the occurrence of predefined 
signatures or sequences that indicate an intrusion. The advantages of this 
technique are that they have the potential for very low false positive rates, and 
the contextual analysis is detailed, which makes it easier for the people who are 
using this detection system to take preventive or corrective action. But the 
drawback of this approach is that it does not perform well at detecting previously 
unknown attacks. 
 
• Anomaly-based detection defines a profile of normal or expected behavior and 
classifies any deviation of that profile as an intrusion. The normal profile is 
updated as the system learns the subject’s behavior. This technique may detect 
previously unknown attacks, but may exhibit high rates of false positives. 
 
• Specification-based detection defines a set of constraints that describe the correct 
operation of a program or protocol, and monitors the execution of the program 
with respect to the defined constraints. This technique may provide the capability 
to detect previously unknown attacks, while exhibiting a low false positive rate. 
 
IDS solutions for fixed wired networks are often hierarchical and deploy network-based 
sensors at key traffic concentration points, such as switches, routers, and firewalls. These 
IDS sensors are physically secured, and use the signature-based detection technique to 
detect attacks. Alerts generated by these distributed IDS sensors are sent to centralized 
security servers for analysis and correlation. The effectiveness of IDS solutions that were 
designed for fixed wired networks are limited for wireless ad-hoc networks due to the 
following reasons [34]: 
 
• Absence of key concentration points in wireless ad-hoc networks where network 
traffic can be monitored limits the effectiveness of a network-based IDS sensor, 
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because only the traffic generated within radio transmission range may be 
monitored. 
 
• It may be difficult to depend on the existence of a centralized server to perform 
analysis and correlation in a dynamically changing ad hoc network. 
 
• The secure distribution of signatures may be difficult, due to the properties of 
wireless communication and mobile nodes that operate in disconnect mode. 
 
Y. Zhang et al. proposed an architecture for intrusion detection in mobile wireless 
networks and evaluated anomaly detection through simulation experiments [17]. In this 
architecture, if a node detects an intrusion with weak or inconclusive evidence, it can 
initiate a cooperative global intrusion detection procedure, or if a node detects locally an 
intrusion with strong evidence, it can independently determine an attack on the network. 
In the intrusion detection architecture, a conceptual model for an IDS agent is described 
that is composed of six units: local data collection, local detection engine, cooperative 
detection engine, local response, global response and secure communication. The 
anomaly detection model employs the following procedure: 1) select audit data to obtain 
a low entropy for the normal dataset; 2) perform appropriate data transformation; 3) 
compute classifier using training data; 4) apply the classifier to test data; and 5) post-
process alarms to produce intrusion reports.  Two classifiers, RIPPER and SVM Light, 
are studied via simulation. The simulation results showed that RIPPER performed 
poorly, which indicated that “quasi-linear anomaly detection analysis used in traditional 
intrusion detection systems can not be used in ad hoc networks”, because high mobility 
defeated such effort. 
 
The shortcoming of a cooperative and distributive IDS architecture is that it could be 
susceptible to attacks from Byzantine nodes, which could independently make false 
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claims of detecting an attack from a correct node with strong evidence, thus making it 
difficult to derive a distributed consensus. 
 
Hierarchical IDS architectures have been proposed for multi-layered, wireless ad-hoc 
networks. In a multi-layered wireless ad hoc network, cluster-head nodes centralized 
routing for the cluster and may support additional security mechanisms. [35] is a three 
layered infrastructure that may be deployed in the tactical battlefield, consisting of two-
layered ground networks and a third layer of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The 
UAVs provide event correlation for a theater of operations. Neighboring ground nodes 
detecting that ground node V is acting malicious send an accusation message to the 
UAV, the UAV will determine that node V is compromised after receiving a threshold of 
K accusations. Then the UAV may respond, such as broadcasting a message to notify all 
nodes in the theater. In this way, a UAV acts as a central security decision point for the 
network. 
 
2.2.3. Key management 
 
Key exchange and distribution is also a significant issue in MANET security. Key 
management's goal is to establish a shared secret between all participating parties. There 
are several methods of achieving this, namely key predistribution, key transport, which 
includes arbitrated keying schemes, and key agreement. Each of these has benefits and 
problems in the ad hoc wireless setting. Key predistribution requires the least 
communication and computation to establish a common key; a node either has a key, or 
it doesn't. Arbitrated keying requires less prior configuration but more messages and 
computation. These protocols often require network synchrony and have a single point 
of failure in the arbitrator, which is not very practical for wireless ad hoc networks. To 
circumvent this, the service may be distributed to several nodes (e.g. in [36]), in which 
more pre-configuration is required and some of the scheme's benefits are lost. 
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The absence of a fixed topology and a central authority makes it difficult to implement 
key management in mobile ad hoc networks. Some solutions have been provided in [37, 
38], in which approaches are proposed such as key generation, issue, storage and 
distribution of public-key certificates. 
 
2.2.4. Unique identification 
 
Since the topology of a mobile ad hoc network is dynamic and self-organizing, a node 
can join and leave the network at any time. Therefore, the maintenance of the identifiers 
(or addresses) of the nodes becomes a problem. If a node does not have a unique and 
recognizable identifier, it can escape from the punishment even if it is detected as 
misbehaving. The following work may help to solve this problem. 
 
It has been noticed that in both of the two approaches that can be used to ensure the 
uniqueness of an address (the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), usually done by 
sending a query to the chosen address and waiting for a response; and the distributed 
assignment of a priori unique addresses, which can also be a bandwidth consuming task 
in a dynamic environment) a merger of two configured networks is very difficult to 
detect and can lead to duplicate addresses. Thus, a continuous and bandwidth-efficient 
duplicate address detection mechanism would be eligible. In this paper, a new DAD 
approach is proposed [39]. In the new approach, the detection of duplicate addresses in a 
passive way, only by monitoring routing protocol traffic.  
 
A “unilateral authentication protocol” is proposed in [40] to protect IPv6 networks 
against abuse of mobile IPv6 primitives. A mobile node uses a partial hash of its public 
key for its IPv6 address. This protocol integrates distribution of public keys and protects 
against falsification of network addresses. Although it is targeted at mobile networks 
with stations, it can also be used in ad hoc networks. 
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Some researchers solved the identifier problem using characteristics of Statistic 
Uniqueness and Cryptographic Verifiability (SUCV) of certain entities, which 
characteristics allow them to severely limit certain classes of denial of service attacks 
and hijacking attacks [41]. The idea is to use identifiers that have a strong cryptographic 
binding with their public components (of their private-public keys). 
 
2.3. QoS Security in Wired Networks 
 
Without the protection from security mechanism, QoS can be vulnerable to various 
attacks. An attacker’s objectives can be one or more of the following: 
 
• Denial of QoS request. This can be achieved by intentionally dropping or 
delaying reservation messages; spoofing teardown message can also result in 
QoS reserved be cancelled by illegal host. 
 
• Degradation of network utilization. An attacker can maliciously alter QoS 
signaling packets, which may result in unnecessary or suboptimal resource 
reservations  
 
• Reserved QoS degradation. Even if QoS resources have been reserved along 
the path, a malicious node on the path can still use the reserved resource 
without proper authorization; or drop or delay data packets intentionally, 
which may result in degradation on reserved QoS. Although QoS violation 
detection mechanisms have been used in a few QoS approaches, the affect 
may not be recovered in a short period of time. 
 
Integrated Services (IntServ) and Differentiated Services (DiffServ) are two models 
proposed to support QoS in networking. RSVP is a signaling protocol for resource 
reservation in IntServ model, which allows some users to access preferential networking 
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resources. RSVP security issues include: node and user authentication, message 
integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, replay attacks and DoS attacks [42].  
 
RSVP cryptography authentication mechanism is used to protect RSVP message 
integrity hop-by-hop [6, 43]. An INTEGRITY object is defined to be carried in RSVP 
message in order to provide the information required for hop-by-hop integrity checking, 
which helps to protect RSVP messages against spoofing and corruption. Hop-by-hop 
authentication cannot prevent attacks by the RSVP nodes on the path, named as insider. 
 
Tsung-li Wu et al. proposed a secure RSVP protocol, Selective Digital Signature with 
Conflict Detection (SDS/CD) for RSVP, which combines attack prevention and intrusion 
detection [44, 45]. The protocol can deal with insider attacks that cannot be countered by 
the RSVP authentication cryptography. They described attacker’s objectives as Denial of 
QoS service request, unnecessary/suboptimal resources reservation, degradation of 
network utilization, and reserved QoS degradation. The algorithm can be simplified as 
follows: 
 
• SenderAlice selectively and digitally signs Tspec(PATH) with her private key, 
ReceiverBob verifies with Alice’s public key; 
 
• ReceiverBob sends RESV piggybacking with historical Adspec(PATH), 
digitally signed with Bob’s private key; 
 
• Intermediate RSVP-enabled router RouterChris verifies if piggypacked 
Adspec(PATH) is less than or equal to the forwarded Adspec(PATH); 
 
• SenderAlice uses Bob’s public key to verify if Rspec(RESV) is correctly 
signed by Bob; 
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• Similar procedure for refresh messages; 
 
• Once a node (or router) detects something abnormal, it sends alarm to the 
Policy Decision Point, which will decide whether to issue intrusion response 
to the misbehaving node. 
 
Vanish Talwar et al. proposed an RSVP-SQOS (RSVP with Scalable QoS protection) 
protocol [42, 46], which targets at the drawbacks of high overhead and bad scalability 
respectively in [6] and [44]. To make the design scalable, RSVP-SQOS divides the 
network into domains or sub-networks and modifies the algorithm in [44]. RSVP-SQOS 
adopts the same idea of digitally signing the non-mutable messages and checking the 
integrity of mutable parameters via feedback messages. The intermediate ingress routers 
as well as the receivers can also generate feedback messages to verify the integrity, 
which will be used to detect malicious attacks during inter sub-networks delivery.  
 
Some researchers have been seeking to prevent against both types of vulnerabilities and 
attacks on QoS: attack on control flow and attack on data flow [47]. The work is 
composed of two parts: resource pricing, which protects control flow, and analysis of 
TCP dropping against attacks on data flow. In resource pricing, the problems that are 
dealt with include unauthorized use of resources and denial of access to an authorized 
user. The demand-based pricing method is used as the solution. The article states that 
packet dropping attack is one of the most difficult attacks to handle among the various 
types of denial of service (DoS) attacks. There are three packet-dropping patterns: 
periodic dropping, retransmission-based dropping and random dropping. The detection 
is conducted at end systems instead of requiring cooperation from other nodes in the 
network.  
 
QoS routing is to find a suitable path through the network between the sources and 
destinations that will have the necessary resources available to meet the QoS constraints 
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for the desired service, and to set up the resource reservation along the path. A 
comprehensive reference for QoS routing problems can be found in [48]. QoS routing, 
dependent on the accurate availability of the current network state, could exact security 
problems because compromised nodes could provide false information or provide 
expired information via replaying old routing messages. Distributed or hop-by-hop 
routing can also introduce new security problems since the source and other nodes are 
involved in path computation by identifying the adjacent router to which the source must 
forward the packet associated with the flow. 
 
2.4. QoS Security in Mobile Networks 
 
There are publications [49] [50] aimed at providing different levels of security among 
different groups of nodes while integrating security into Quality of Service as a 
parameter.  
 
Cluster based Routing for End-to-end Security and Quality of service satisfaction 
(CRESQ), a new QoS routing protocol for ad hoc networks, is proposed in [49]. It uses 
clustering to minimize the routing overhead and uses localized route recovery to 
minimize route and QoS re-establishment delay. In CEWSQ, a route is established with 
the involvement of intermediate clusters, which means the routing algorithm interactions 
take place at the cluster level. It considers QoS parameters before making a connection. 
The source node is aware of the intermediate nodes and the information will be used in 
case security is desired. The source node may specify levels of security (such as 
authentication, encryption and etc.) in the QoS specification. 
 
As we have mentioned, SAR protocol  is presented in [30] and [50] . The protocol also 
incorporates security attributes as parameters into ad hoc route discovery. SAR employs 
the idea of “quality of security” and ensures data are routed through a secure path only 
composed of nodes at the same trust level. 
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3. A LIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR 
MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
 
Most ad hoc networks do not employ any network access control, leaving them 
vulnerable to resource consumption attacks. In ad hoc networks, users need to assure the 
party who supposedly sent a message to another party is indeed the legitimate party. 
Otherwise, a malicious node could tamper a network with falsified data. These attacks 
can result in degraded performance of networks, interference of resource reservation, 
and unauthorized use of resources.  
 
Authentication mechanisms are used to ensure that the entity who supposedly sent a 
message to another party is indeed the legitimate entity. General security requirements 
for authentication include protection against replay attacks, resistance against man-in-
the-middle attacks and provision of confidentiality. There are two basic kinds of 
cryptography that have been widely used for the traditional Internet: symmetric 
cryptography and asymmetric cryptography (such as digital signature).  
 
Different from the fixed networks, the communication links in mobile ad hoc networks 
are open shared medium, which makes the communications between neighboring nodes 
more vulnerable to attacks such as packet forging and malicious alteration. In addition, 
mobile ad hoc networks are characterized by absence of fixed infrastructure, rapid 
topology change and constrained resources (such as limited battery power, small 
computational capacity and bandwidth). These characteristics determine that the 
authentication protocols used for routing and data packet delivery in MANETs should be 
lightweight and scalable. Asymmetric cryptography does not adapt well to MANETs in 
that the processing required for asymmetric cryptography is very CPU intensive and the 
technique has been proved to be prohibitively insufficient in wireless ad hoc networks in 
terms of message overhead and computation complexity. Symmetric cryptography 
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algorithms are fast. Nevertheless, it introduces complexity in key maintenance and exerts 
difficulty in authentication for multicast or broadcast communications. 
 
Moreover, radio channels in wireless networks are more erroneous and lossy than the 
communication links in the Internet. With multiple receivers, there could be a high 
variance among the bandwidth and radio interference of different receivers, with high 
packet loss for the receivers with low bandwidth and high radio interference. In 
consideration of this problem, the authentication mechanism is expected to be effective 
even in the presence of high packet loss.  
 
The idea of TESLA key is proposed in [51].TESLA uses one-way hashed chain to 
generate keys, and delays disclosure of keys to guarantee that a node receives the packet 
before another node can forge the packet with already released keys. But the security 
condition of TESLA requires clock synchronization, which is very difficult to achieve in 
mobile ad hoc networks, if not impossible. 
 
The design of our protocol is motivated by LHAP (a Lightweight Hop-by-hop 
Authentication Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks) [52]. LHAP is a lightweight hop-by-hop 
authentication specially designed for ad hoc networks. It uses two keys: TRAFFIC key 
and TESLA key. TRAFFIC key is used to authenticate packets; and TESLA key is used 
to achieve trust maintenance by authenticating KEYUPDATE message. KEYUPDATE 
message is sent periodically to guarantee that the current released key is valid so that a 
malicious node will not be able to use an obsolete key to forge a packet. LHAP is not 
only a comprehensive authentication approach, by thoroughly describing key 
management and traffic authentication, but also proved to be computationally efficient. 
However, it requires two keys, which hence not only adds more complexity in 
authentication, but also needs to periodically send key maintenance packages that 
themselves need to be authenticated with TESLA keys.  In addition, LHAP does not 
eliminate the disadvantage of delayed authentication in TESLA because the authenticity 
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of the packets and the TRAFFIC key can not be verified until TESLA key is 
authenticated. 
 
In this chapter, we will propose a lightweight authentication protocol, which utilizes 
one-way hash chain to provide effective and efficient authentication for neighboring 
communications in MANETs. Our protocol is lightweight, scalable and tolerant of 
packet loss.  
 
3.1. The Authentication Protocol 
 
This authentication protocol utilizes one-way hash chains, which is more efficient and 
less expensive than asymmetric cryptographic operations. One-way hash chain is a 
widely-used cryptographic primitive that uses a one-way hash function to generate a 
sequence of random values that serve as authentication keys. It has been used in 
authentication schemes for wireless ad hoc networks [29] and sensor networks [53]. 
  
Figure 1 demonstrates the one-way hash chain construction, utilization and revelation. 
To generate a key chain of length n+1, the first element of the chain 0h is randomly 
picked and then the chain is generated by repeatedly applying a one-way function 
(denoted as H in Figure 1). A one-way hash function maps an input of any length to a 
fixed-length bit string, which is defined as φ}1,0{}1,0{: * →H , where φ is the length of 
the output of the hash function – the newly generated key. The function H should be 
simple to compute, nonetheless must be computationally infeasible in general to invert. 
In utilization and revelation of these keys, we use the reverse direction of key 
generation: we start from nh , the last generated, and then 1−nh , …, 0h . Any key of the one-
way key chain commits to all previous keys2, and 
nh is a commitment to the entire one-
                                                 
2
 In the dissertation, when we refer to the direction of key generation as the direction of the chain. For example, the subsequent 
key of h0 is h1, and so on.   
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way chain. Any key jh can be verified from ih ( nji ≤<≤0 ) to be indeed an element in 
the chain by repeatedly applying H for ij − times, that is, )( iijj hHh −= . Therefore, 
given an existing authenticated element of a one-way hash chain, it is possible to verify 
elements later in the sequence of use within the chain. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of one-way hash chain 
 
 
The chain of keys can be created all at once off-line before the mobile node joins the 
network and then stored for later use. 
 
We use the following notations to describe our authentication protocol (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Notation for Authentication Protocol 
Symbol Description 
A, B Identities of mobile nodes 
CertA Certificate of node A’s public key 
signed by CA’s private key 
SignA(M) Digital signature of message M, signed 
with node A’s private key 
MAC(M, K) MAC over message M with key K 
A
ih  The i
th
 key in node A’s one-way hash 
chain 
AH  Node A’s hash function 
k
AH  Applying A’s hash function for k times 
M1|M2 The concatenation of message M1 and 
M2 
A
iP  The i
th
 packet of node A’s. 
Generate keys 
hn-1 … … h1 
H(h1) h0 
H(h2) h2 
H(hn-1) hn 
H(hn) 
Use/Revealkeys 
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In this section, we will discuss the assumptions on which our protocol is established, 
which is followed by a detailed description on the basic scheme of our authentication 
protocol, including trust management and message authentication; and at last we will 
address the problem of key disclosure.  
 
3.1.1. Assumptions 
 
To prevent a malicious entity from forging packets with MACs that are computed using 
already released key, a packet sent by a node has to be received by an immediate 
neighboring node before a third party is able to replay the packet to it, unless the receiver 
has dropped the packet. This necessary condition for authentication using one hash key 
chain is assured in our approach by using delayed key disclosure. The scheme of key 
disclosure will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
We assume that each node can communicate with a trusted certificate authority (CA) 
before it enters the ad hoc network, and it can obtain a public key certificate signed by 
the CA as well as an authentic public key of the CA. The public key of the CA will be 
used to verify key certificates distributed by other nodes. However, a node may not be 
able to contact the CA after it joins the network because it is difficult for an ad hoc 
network to provide a central administration point since all the nodes in an ad hoc 
network are mobile. Moreover, a central entity is very likely to become the most 
vulnerable point in the network, which is subject to various malicious attacks.  
 
We also assume that the mobile nodes that we are protecting are relatively underpowered 
so that asymmetric key operations such as digital signatures are too expensive for them 
to compute for each packet. In our scheme, digital signature is only used in trust 
bootstrapping so that the nodes can verify the genuineness of the first revealed key. Once 
the initial key is confirmed to be authentic, the subsequent keys can be verified by 
applying the one-way hash function. 
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On the contrary, the adversaries are powerful with the following capabilities: (1) an 
adversary can be capable of various attacks: eavesdrop, delay, drop, replay or alter 
packets; (2) an adversary’s computation resources can be very large but yet limited. This 
means that an adversary may be able to conduct fast computations, such as computing 
MACs with negligible delay. The adversary, nevertheless, cannot invert a hash function 
and hence cannot obtain a hash key before the key owner reveals it. 
 
3.1.2. Trust management 
 
1) Trust bootstrapping 
 
To use one-way hash key chain for authentication, a node needs to distribute an 
authentic key such as hn, which is the first revealed key from its generated chain. This 
key commits to the whole key chain and therefore the genuineness of the subsequent 
keys can be verified by applying hash function to this key, such as: given a key hi, it is a 
genuine key from the chain if )( iinn hHh −= ; if not, it is a counterfeit key. 
 
Our scheme requires that a node contact the certificate authority to obtain public key of 
the CA as well as the certificate of the node’s own public key before it joins an ad hoc 
network. The node can also pre-compute the whole one-way hash key chain off-line to 
reduce computational latency. Then the node signs the message with its private key and 
broadcasts a JOIN message to its neighbors. We suppose that a node, say node A, is 
sending JOIN message to its neighbors. The JOIN message will be in the following 
format: 
 
),,(},{,: AAnAAAnA HhASignHhACertA ∗→  
 
where CertA denotes the certificate of node A’s public key that has been signed by CA’s 
private key; A denotes the identity of node A; and ),,( AAnA HhASign denotes the digital 
signature of message }{ AAn HhA .  
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Upon receiving this JOIN message, every receiving node first uses CA’s public key to 
verify the certificate of A’s public key. Once the genuineness of node A’s public key is 
confirmed, the key can be used to verify the digital signature on A’s message. If the 
digital signature is validated to be authentic, the receiving node will record A’s initial 
key A
nh as well as its hash function AH . 
 
To bootstrap an authentic hash key to node A, each of its neighbors (say node B) 
unicasts the following ACK message to node A: 
 
),,(},{,: BBmBBBmB HhBSignHhBCertAB →  
 
where B
mh denotes B’s most recently released key. Node A will perform the same 
verifications on B’s ACK message as what node B did with A’s JOIN message. 
 
2) Trust maintenance 
 
The trust relationship between a node and its neighbors is maintained with a periodical 
broadcast of KEYUPDATE message. In the KEYUPDATE message, a key that has been 
used to compute MACs will be released, and the neighboring nodes will verify the new 
released key with corresponding hash function. The maintenance process is described 
below: 
 
Each node periodically broadcasts a KEYUPDATE message to its neighbors, which 
discloses its most recently used key:  
A
jhAA ,:∗→  
 
The key Ajh will be authenticated by its neighbors based on the previously released 
key Ajh 1+ : if it can be proved that 
A
j
A
jA hhH 1)( += , the key Ajh  is considered valid; 
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otherwise, the key is invalid and the receiving node may optionally issue an intrusion 
alert to other nodes. 
 
3) Trust termination 
 
In our authentication scheme, the trust relationship between two nodes may be 
terminated under two circumstances. First, when a node is detected to be compromised, 
the detecting nodes will permanently terminate their trust relationship with the 
compromised node. In this case, a further step such as excluding the node from the 
network might be taken. Second, when a node does not receive the KEYUPDATE 
message from a neighbor for a period that exceeds a predefined threshold, it will 
terminate its trust of the neighbor temporarily. This can happen when the neighboring 
node moves out of the node’s transmission range, or when the neighboring node is not 
transmitting any data packets for a fairly long time (we assume that in case a node does 
not have any packets to send, it will not release key periodically in order to save its 
keys). If the two nodes want to restart their communications, they can run the trust 
bootstrapping process again to reestablish their trust relationship. The value of the 
threshold is dependent on the size of the cache for authentication at the node. The cache 
is used to store the authentication information of other nodes’, such as hash function, 
previously released key, and non-verified messages. A node with a larger cache can store 
more commitment information and therefore a trust relationship may be kept for longer 
time. 
 
3.1.3. Message authentication 
 
When a node wants to send a message, it computes the MAC on the message and then 
unicast to the receiving node (say node B), or multicast (or broadcast) the packet 
(denoted as PA) to the receivers in the following format: 
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),(,:(*) AihMMACMBA →  
 
where Aih is the currently used key of node A’s. Note that the key 
A
ih has not been 
disclosed at this point. The originator of the packet (node A in this case) will later 
disclose Aih  in KEYUPDATE message. The key enables the receiver to verify the MAC 
of the message. If the verification is successful, the message is then authenticated and 
trusted. Once the key is disclosed, it becomes obsolete and can not be used to generate 
MACs any more. 
  
3.1.4. Key disclosure 
 
1) Security condition and threat model on authentication 
 
This authentication protocol can be compromised if an adversary obtains node A’s secret 
key Aih before a receiver receives the data packet that is protected with this key, because 
the adversary would be able to change the message and then use the key to recompute 
the MAC of PA, or even to forge all subsequent traffic. To prevent from this type of 
attacks, the receiver needs to be assured that it receives the data packet before the 
corresponding key is disclosed by the sender. The following security condition describes 
this requirement: 
 
“A data packet P arrived safely, if the receiver receives the packet when the sender did 
not yet send out the corresponding key disclosure packet.” 
 
It is known that radio channels in MANETs are more prone to error than those in the 
Internet because wireless communication links use open shared medium. The erroneous 
communication caused by signal conflicts may result in deteriorations of packets or even 
packet drops.  
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Figure 2 exemplifies an attack that takes advantage of KEYUPDATE packet drop to 
send maliciously modified or forged packets. Suppose node A is sending a message Ms 
to its neighbors with MAC (denoted by MAC(Ms, K) in Figure 2), which was generated 
with key K. Then A discloses key K to its neighbors B, C, D and M. Suppose node B 
does not immediately receive the message Ms and the KEYUPDATE message due to 
signal conflict at its channel. Node M, which is a malicious entity, then takes advantage 
of this chance to modify the message to Ms’ and sends the tampered packet to node B 
with a MAC that is generated using the disclosed key K (denoted by MAC(Ms’, K) in 
Figure 2). Node B would believe that it is a legitimate packet from A when it later 
receives the resent KEYUPDATE message from A (or a replayed KEYUPDATE 
message from node M). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of in-the-middle attack on key disclosure 
 
 
2) Delayed key disclosure 
 
To prevent from the “in-the-middle” attacks described above, a receiver should have the 
knowledge of when to expect a KEYUPDATE message. TESLA uses delayed key 
disclosure to solve the problem. It also uses time synchronization to guarantee that the 
receiver can unambiguously verify if the security condition holds on each packet and 
then decide to keep or drop the packet. However, clock synchronization relies on two 
assumptions: first, the nodes to be synchronized have the ability to periodically exchange 
Ms, MAC(Ms, K) 
Ms’, MAC (Ms’,K) 
KEYUPDATE 
D 
C 
M 
B A 
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messages; and second, the nodes have the ability to estimate the time it takes for a 
message to travel between them. In mobile ad hoc networks, the high mobility of nodes 
lead to frequent reconfiguration of topology and frequent change of communication 
capacity between two nodes. Therefore, clock synchronization is very difficult (if not 
impossible) to achieve in a MANET in that there is no central control and packet delays 
may vary due to unpredictable mobility and radio interference. 
 
Our authentication protocol uses delayed key disclosure without requirement for clock 
synchronization. In the protocol, a currently used key is broadcast after the key has been 
used to generate or verify MACs for a time interval. This time interval, namely delay of 
key disclosure in this context, is determined by the sender and announced in the data 
packets that are protected with the key. Before a key is disclosed, the packets with 
MACs that are computed with the key cannot be authenticated. Packets can be stored in 
cache at the receiving node until the key has been received and the authentication is 
completed. 
 
We define the delay of key disclosure, denoted by d, as the time difference between key 
disclosure and the time when sender starts to send messages that use the key to compute 
MACs. Specifically, if a sender starts to send the first packet that is authenticated via 
MACs with key K at time 0t , then key K will be disclosed at time 0t t d= + . Suppose 
there are m packets on which MACs are computed with key K: denoted by 
1 2, , ,
K K K
mP P P respectively in sequence of being sent, and the times when they will be 
sent are 1 2, , ,
K K K
mt t t respectively. We denote the time interval between sending of the 
packet and the key disclosure as r, and the interval for packet i as ri.  The timeline is 
shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. An example of the timeline for a delayed key disclosure 
 
 
In the example demonstrated in Figure 3, we have: 
1 1
2 2
( );
;
.
K K
K K
K K
m m
r t t d
r t t
r t t
= − =
= −
= −

 
 
In our protocol, a sender announces the remaining time r in its data packets3. The 
receiver can estimate when to expect the arrival of the KEYUPDATE message 
according to the remaining time. Suppose the receiver receives the packet 
(1 )KiP i m≤ ≤ at time Kirt . The remaining time indicated in the packet is ri. In case that 
the data packet and the KEYUPDATE message are delivered at the same transmission 
rate, the KEYUPDATE message should arrive at the receiving end at time K Ki irt rt r= + . 
If the data packet and the KEYUPDATE message are delivered at different transmission 
rate (supposedly the difference is δ), then the KEYUPDATE message should be 
expected at the receiving end at K Ki irt rt r δ= + + . δ can be estimated at each node 
according to its observation on the traffic .  
 
This scheme eliminates the need for clock synchronization, which is used in TESLA. 
Although it still needs to estimate the difference between transmission rates of a data 
                                                 
3
 Note that the time when a packet will be sent can not be exactly known at the time of packet generation. However, it 
can still be accurately predicted according to the cache status at each node. 
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d ( or r1) 
tK 
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packet and its KEYUPDATE message, it is easier than clock synchronization because it 
does not need to estimate the absolute value of transmission delay. Instead, it only needs 
to estimate the variance of the transmission delays on data packets and the corresponding 
KEYUPDATE message, which is much easier. 
 
In our protocol, it is possible that a key (say hi) is disclosed after the packets using the 
next key hi-1 have been sent. Therefore, the receiver needs to know which key is used for 
which packets. To solve this problem, we include the index of the key in data packets, so 
that the receiver will be able to know which key should be used to authenticate the 
message. Therefore, a data packet from node A destined to all its neighbors (broadcast) 
or to node B (unicast) is in the following format: 
 
*( ) : , ( ), ,A B M MAC M r index→  
 
where index denotes the index of the key that will be used to authenticate the message. 
And the KEYUPDATE message will be: 
 
: , ,AjA A h index→ ∗  
 
The index of the key is not protected in the message. In case that it is tampered such as 
maliciously increased or decreased, it can still be verified by repeatedly applying hash 
functions to the key until the result matches the previously received key and meanwhile 
counting how many times the function has been applied. For example, if the newly 
arrived key is K and the previously received key is K’ and ' ( )nK H K= , then 
( ) ( ') .index K index K n= +  
 
Using this method, our protocol is tolerant of packet loss because the key verification is 
not based on the immediate previous key. 
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In our scheme, the delay of key disclosure can vary for different keys. It is not a 
predetermined and unchanging value since establishment of the trust relationship, as 
what TESLA has used. The advantage of varying delays of key disclosure is that it 
allows a sender to choose key disclosure period according to the pattern of the traffic 
transmitted by the sender: when the traffic is heavier, the delay should be smaller; and 
vice versa. This can prevent the cache from being “flooded”. An example of this varied 
delays scheme is demonstrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Varied delays of a key disclosure 
 
 
3) Comparison with TESLA key disclosure scheme 
 
The differences between our key disclosure and that of TESLA are: 
  
• We broadcast KEYUPDATE message to release keys, while TESLA releases keys 
in data packets. Because different data packets may be targeted at different groups 
of receivers, TESLA is not able to guarantee that the key would be disclosed to all 
the receivers that have received the data packets protected by the key. 
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• Our protocol eliminates the need for clock synchronization. Clock synchronization 
has been proved to be prohibitively difficult and therefore we argue that it should 
be used in authentication mechanisms.  
 
• In our protocol, the delay of key disclosure is not a fixed value since configuration 
of the network, as TESLA has used. It is up to the sender to decide the delay 
values based on the traffic status of the network. It allows more flexibility than 
TESLA and avoids the problem of authentication cache overflow. 
 
3.2. Security Analysis 
 
1) Trust management  
 
Our protocol uses digital signature in both initial trust establishment and subsequent trust 
reestablishment. Compared to the scheme that uses asymmetric cryptography in only 
initial trust bootstrapping, our protocol can guarantee the genuineness of the key that 
commits to all the subsequent keys, and an “in-the-middle” attacker would not be able to 
replay an already released key and forge packets with the obsolete key afterward. 
 
2) Message authentication 
 
Up to date, MD5 [54] and SHA-1 [55] are two of the most widely used cryptographic 
hash functions. MD5 has been recently shown to be vulnerable to collision search 
attacks [56].  This type of attacks and other currently known weaknesses of MD5 can be 
thwarted by the use of MD5 within HMAC [57]. MD5-HMAC is proved to be more 
secure than MD5 in protecting the authenticity of traffic. 
 
Our message authentication can effectively thwart the attacks of forging or maliciously 
alteration of packets. 
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3) Key disclosure 
 
The delayed key disclosure can prevent from in-the-middle attack in which an adversary 
may use an obsolete key to forge or alter packets. However, the performance is 
dependent on the value of the delay.  
 
Non-repudiation is also achievable in case of using large delay values. 
 
3.3. Performance Analysis 
 
In this section, we will evaluate the trust management and message authentication 
approach. We will evaluate the delayed key disclosure scheme as well. 
 
3.3.1. Simulation setup 
 
We use Network Simulator, ns2, for our simulations. We use two scenarios for our 
simulation: 
 
Scenario 1: The first scenario we used is demonstrated in Figure 5. There are totally nine 
nodes in the scenario. Eight of them (denoted as N1, N2, … , N8 in Figure 5) serve as 
transmission nodes, who transmit packets to one single receiving node (denoted as N9 in 
Figure 5).  Node N9 is the sink of all the traffic. The nodes are positioned at the mesh 
that is demonstrated in the figure. Static network topology used in this scenario allows us 
to easily observe the network performance (such as hop-by-hop delay, etc.) according to 
varied channel loads. 
 
Scenario 2:  In our second scenario, 50 mobile nodes are randomly distributed in a 
1500x300 rectangular space. The node mobility model is random waypoint model, 
which is commonly used in simulations for mobile ad hoc networks. The maximum node 
speed is 20 m/s. This scenario allows us to observe the performance of our protocol in a 
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complicated environment that is more similar than Scenario 1 to a network in the real 
world. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Network topology of a 9-node scenario 
 
 
 
3.3.2. Performance evaluation for the trust management and message 
authentication 
 
The performance metrics employed to analyze the trust management and message 
authentication approach are: computational overhead, authentication latency, message 
overhead.  Our performance evaluation is based on theoretical analysis and simulation 
results.  
 
We use a widely used simulation tool – ns-2 [58]. Our simulation is based on a 1500 by 
300 meters rectangle space. 50 nodes move from a random starting position to a random 
destination with a random speed uniformly distributed between 0 to 20 m/sec. If it is not 
specified, the pause time of nodes is set to 60 seconds. The Media Access Control layer 
protocol is IEEE 802.11 and the transport protocol is User Datagram Protocol (UDP), 
N2 (0, 100) 
N1 (0, 0) 
N3 (0, 200) N4 (100, 200) N5 (200, 200) 
N6 (200, 100) 
N7 (200, 0) N8 (100, 0) 
N9  
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which are both available as a part of the simulator. The length of data packet is 512 bytes 
and the traffic sources used are Constant-Bit-Rate (CBR). 
 
1) Computational overhead 
 
As any authentication mechanisms, our protocol introduces computational overhead by 
two operations: message authentication and trust management.  
 
In our protocol, symmetric cryptography is used for message authentication. It is known 
that symmetric cryptographic operations are three to four orders of magnitude faster than 
asymmetric operations, especially on CPU limited devices.  
 
We used asymmetric cryptography in trust bootstrapping, that is, when a node is 
establishing or reestablishing trust relationship with its neighboring nodes. This may 
introduce more overhead than LHAP because LHAP employs digital signature only 
when the trust is bootstrapped for the first time. However, we have argued that using 
digital signature is necessary even in re-bootstrapping since the key release is vulnerable 
to replay attack, especially when the receiving node has moved out of transmission range 
for a time interval and hence is likely to be unaware of the currently released key. It will 
not introduce significant overhead on receivers because signature verification is much 
faster than signature generation [59].  
 
Moreover, our protocol only maintains one authentication key, which consumes fewer 
resources such as CPU and memory than LHAP, which maintains two keys – TRAFFIC 
key and TESLA key. We only use digital signature for trust bootstrapping. The trust 
maintenance is still based on one-way hash function, which is so efficient that it is 
usually considered negligible. 
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2) Authentication latency 
 
The latency of authenticating a packet is introduced by two parts: MAC verification 
latency and key disclosure delay. 
 
MAC verification is accomplished by computing one hash. The latency for this 
verification is less than one millisecond even for very constrained computational 
capability such as handheld PDAs [59].  
  
The delay of key disclosure is a value that is determined by the sender of packets based 
on the traffic pattern. A very small delay may cause difficulty in satisfying the security 
condition and consequently increase the risk to key replay attack; while large delay may 
result in an increase on authentication latency. Tradeoff should be made between 
performance and security properties. A quantity analysis on the delay of key disclosure 
will be included in our future work. 
 
3) Message overhead 
 
Message overhead is introduced by trust management messages (such as trust 
bootstrapping, KEYUPDATE and trust relationship termination messages) and MACs of 
packets. 
 
Suppose that the authentication is performed using MD5 Message Digest Algorithm. 
Then the MAC attached to each packet is a hashed digest that is 128-bit long. If the data 
packet size is 512 bytes, the overhead introduced by MACs is approximately 3%, which 
is very small. 
 
The overhead introduced by trust management varies with the frequency of 
bootstrapping and KEYUPDATE messages. It is obvious that high node mobility will 
result in more frequent trust bootstrapping and therefore introduce more overhead. In 
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addition, a node sending more traffic will lead to more frequent broadcast of 
KEYUPDATE messages, which also introduces more overhead. 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates the simulation results of the KEYUPDATE messages that have 
been resent. The data packet rates vary from 2 packets per second to 10 packets per 
second. We assume that the KEYUPDATE messages are sent with the same rate of the 
data packets. This implies that we use a new key for each data packet, which is the worst 
case for KEYUPDATE messages in term of message overhead.  
 
We can tell that from the figure the packet resent rate increases with increase of packet 
rate. When data packets are sent with the rate of 2 packets per second, the resent rate is 
only 0.03%, which can be ignored. The resent rate increases to 37.33% when data 
packets are sent with a rate of 10 packets per second. In this case, the message overhead 
introduced by KEYUPDATE messages is 9.7% assuming that the identification of a 
node is128-bit long and the index of the key is 128-bit long too.  
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Figure 6. Resent rate of KEYUPDATE messages 
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The standard deviations of the percentages are shown in the figure too with the vertical 
lines on the values.  
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Where  denotes the standard deviation, x denotes the mean, and N denotes the number 
of the samples. 
 
3.3.3. Performance analysis for delayed key disclosure 
 
To analyze our delayed key disclosure scheme, we first take a measurement on average 
hop-by-hop delay. Hop-by-hop delay of data packets is an important metric in 
determining the value of the delay that should be used in key disclosure scheme, in that 
the key disclosure delay should be large enough to guarantee arrival of the data packets 
before the key but meanwhile be as small as possible to achieve low authentication 
latency. We use hop-by-hop delay instead of end-to-end delay because our 
authentication protocol is designed for neighboring communications and the 
transmissions the protocol is aimed to protect are only one-hop transmissions.  
 
Then we will use different key disclosure delay values to evaluate the performance, in 
metrics such as percentage of packets arriving safely and dropped packet rate.  
 
1) Average hop-by-hop delay 
 
 We measured average hop-by-hop delay on both Physical Layer level and Network 
Layer. The delay on the Physical level is mostly the transmission time the packet takes 
in the air. We tested it in the scenario where there are two nodes, one of which transmits 
packets to the other. The distance between the two nodes is 150 meters. The average 
delay is 0.00467269 second with a deviation of less than 1x 10-6 second. 
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The average hop-by-hop delay at the network layer is tested in both the scenarios of 9 
nodes and 50 nodes we described earlier in this section. The hop-by-hop delay is 
calculated as end-to-end delay (a packet takes from the source to the destination) divided 
by the number of links a packet has traversed during delivery from the source to 
destination (the number of hops), i.e. 
 
hopsofnumber
delayendtoenddelayhopbyhop −−=−−
 
 
We measured the delay at the Network Layer because the key disclosure delay value 
(denoted as r in previous sections) will be determined and stamped on data packets 
above the Medium Access Control Layer level. Above Medium Access Control Layer, 
data packet delay may result not only from the transmission in the air but also from the 
backoff due to channel contention at Medium Access Control layer and from the queue 
delay. 
 
The results for Scenario 1 (9 nodes) are shown in Figure 7 (a). The deviations are too 
small (less than 0.00002 second for all the cases) to be shown in the figure. 
 
We tested average hop-by-hop delay in Scenario 2 with varied pause time, which is 
changed from 60 seconds to 480 seconds in an interval of 60 seconds (see Figure 7 (b)). 
The hop-by-hop delay for each packet rate is the average value from the cases with 
different pause time. The vertical line at each point presents the deviation of the value.  
 
We can see from Figure 7 that average hop-by-hop delay increases with the increase of 
the data packet rate. The reason for this increasing delay is that increased packet rates 
result in larger channel load and therefore more channel contention for packets, and the 
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channel contention causes more backoff time for data packets. Table 2 and Table 3 give 
the average channel loads4 according to the packet rates in Scenario 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 7. Average hop-by-hop packet delay 
 
 
With the same data packet rate, the average channel loads in Scenario 2 are less than the 
corresponding channel loads in Scenario 1. However, the delay values are larger than 
those in the scenario of 9 nodes. This is caused by the following reasons: 
 
First, channel loads do not always accurately reflect the contention status at a channel, 
because a node’s neighboring communications may also affect its capability of receiving 
packets and the packets in these communications are not accounted as its channel load. 
In Scenario 2, although the channel loads are lighter, the contention is more intensive in 
that most of the nodes have more neighbors than node N9 in the first scenario. As we 
have mentioned earlier, more intensive contentions result in more backoffs and hence 
larger transmission delays. 
                                                 
4
 Please note that here “channel” refers to the medium that a nodes shares with all its neighbors, which is different from “link”, 
which refers to the point-to-point medium that two neighboring nodes use for transmission. 
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(a) Hop-by-hop delay in Scenario 1 (b) Hop-by-hop delay in Scenario 2 
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Second, node mobility may also introduce delays since it can cause re-routing when the 
network topology changes. These routing packets will compete with data packets for the 
bandwidth of channels and therefore cause more backoffs on data packets. 
 
Table 2. Average Channel Load (Scenario 1) 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) Channel load (bps) 
Channel load 
Percentage (%) 
2 173974 8.70 
 4 374926 
 
18.75 
 6 534254 
 
26.71 
 8 733054 
 
36.65 
 10 907016 45.35 
 
 
 
Table 3. Average Channel Load (Scenario 2) 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) Channel load (bps) 
Channel load 
Percentage (%) 
2 57096 
 
2.85 
 4 107592 
 
5.38 
 6 125818 
 
6.29 
 8 156477 
 
7.82 
 10 182633 
 
9.13 
 
 
 
From the above simulations, we can conclude that hop-by-hop delay increases with 
increase of traffic load in the neighborhood. Therefore, a sender should use larger key 
disclosure delay in case of heavier traffic load. 
 
2) Percentage of packets arriving safely  
 
According to the average hop-by-hop delay demonstrated in Figure 7, we tested our key 
disclosure scheme with varied disclosure delay values. The percentages of data packets 
that arrive safely according to different data packet rates are shown in Figure 8. We 
observe that more than 97.6% of the data packets have arrived safely when the key 
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disclosure delay is set to 3 seconds; more than 94.8% of the data packets have arrived 
safely if the key disclosure delay is set to 2 seconds, in all the cases of different data 
packet rates. 
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Figure 8. Rate of packets arriving safely 
 
 
3) Dropped packet rate 
 
We also test the dropped packet rates with different cache sizes. We use very small 
cache sizes (16 packets and 32 packets) to observe the performance. The key disclosure 
scheme should have less dropped packet rates in real networks since larger cache sizes 
(such as 128 packets) are often used.  
 
The results for the two cache sizes are shown in Figure 9 (a) and Figure 9 (b) 
respectively. From the simulation, we have noticed that with increase of data packet 
rates, the drop rate at the cache increases too. We can also observe that, if the cache size 
is as small as 16 packets, there will be about 39% data packets dropped at the cache at 10 
packets per second of data packet rate if the key disclosure delay is set to 2 seconds. In 
case of 3 seconds key disclosure delay, the drop rate will increase to 60% or so. With the 
cache size of 32 packets, drop rate decreases to 0 in case of 2 seconds or lower key 
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disclosure delay in case that the data packet rate is 10 packets per second. If the key 
disclosure delay is 3 seconds, the drop rate is about 19%. However, if we use a cache 
with size of 64 packets, the drop rate will drop to 0 no matter what the data packet rate is 
(in a 2 pkt/s to 10 pkt/s range).  
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Figure 9. Average dropped packet rate 
 
 
If we use a cache of 64-byte length, the dropped packet rate will be 0 even with 10 
pkt/sec data packet rate. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
Most ad hoc networks do not employ any network access control, leaving them 
vulnerable to resource consumption attacks. In ad hoc networks, users need to assure the 
party who supposedly sent a message to another party that it is indeed the legitimate 
party. Otherwise, a malicious node could tamper a network with falsified data. These 
attacks can result in degraded performance of networks, interference of resource 
reservation, and unauthorized use of resources. To deal with these attacks, an 
authentication protocol needs to be in place to ensure that a packet is sent by an 
authentic and legitimate node. 
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In this chapter, we have proposed a lightweight authentication protocol that effectively 
and efficiently provides security properties such as authenticity and integrity for 
communicating neighbor nodes in MANETs. The protocol utilizes one-way hash chains 
to compute authentication keys, which not only eliminates the high performance 
overhead imposed by asymmetric cryptography (such as digital signatures), but also 
avoids the difficulty of key management introduced by secret paired symmetric key. Our 
protocol also used delayed key disclosure to prevent a malicious entity from forging 
packets with Message Authentication Codes (MACs) with an already released key.  
 
The authentication protocol is lightweight, scalable and tolerant of packet loss. The 
performance analysis showed that the protocol incurs low overhead penalty and also 
achieves a tradeoff between security and performance. The delayed key disclosure 
approach can achieve an extremely low dropped packet rate if the data packets are 
cached in a fair size buffer before being authenticated. 
  
60 
4. SECURITY IN QOS MODELS AND SIGNALING SYSTEMS FOR 
MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
 
Integrated Services (IntServ) [1] and Differentiated Services (DiffServ or DS) [2] are 
two commonly used QoS models that have been proposed for the traditional Internet and 
are also being investigated for MANET environment. Flexible QoS Model for MANETs 
(FQMM) [2] is a model proposed solely for mobile ad hoc networks. These QoS models 
specify architectures in which some kinds of services could be provided. 
 
QoS signaling is used to search for routes with sufficient resources for desired QoS, to 
reserve and release resources, to set up, tear down and renegotiate flows in the networks. 
Some QoS signaling systems have been proposed for MANETs, such as INSIGNIA 
system [10], QoS AODV [11] and etc [14].  
 
To solve the security problems of QoS signaling for MANETs, we propose a security 
mechanism for QoS Signaling Systems to provide authentication and detect malicious 
attacks on QoS parameters. We report our simulation results to demonstrate the low 
delay penalty achieved by the proposed system. 
 
Security is a significant aspect for QoS signaling systems. However, there is little work 
published on the topic of intrusion detection and security prevention on QoS signaling. 
 
While the two mechanisms that have been proposed, SDS/CD and RSVP-SQoS, protect 
the RSVP messages in an efficient and flexible manner, neither of them can be applied 
to MANET QoS signaling systems due to the following reasons:  
 
• They employed digital signature mechanism for integrity and non-repudiation 
protection, which has been proved very expensive for MANETs in terms of 
message overhead and the computing complexity. 
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• They can efficiently detect misbehavior on concave QoS parameters such as 
bandwidth, but not applicable to additive metrics such as delay or jitter.  
 
Therefore, to provide security characteristic to QoS signaling in MANETs, a new 
mechanism is necessary. 
 
4.1. QoS Model Security in MANETs 
 
The IntServ model provides an end-to-end QoS guarantee on a per-flow basis. It requires 
that every IntServ-enabled router keep the flow-specific states including bandwidth 
requirements, delay bound and cost of the flow, and therefore is not scalable for the 
Internet. However, the scalability problem of the Internet IntServ model is less likely to 
occur in the current MANETs in consideration of the small number of traffic flows and 
the limit size of the network [3]. In addition, because rapid change of nodal roles 
necessitates inclusion of all functions at all nodes in MANETs, the requirement that each 
node in the IntServ domain has to apply all the functions such as classification, 
admission control and scheduling, which deters the IntServ implementation for wired 
networks, does not introduce any extra problem for MANETs. 
 
DiffServ is designed to provide more scalability and greater flexibility than the IntServ 
for wired networks. The DiffServ model is based on flow aggregation by classifying 
packets into a limited number of classes and then applying specific forwarding treatment 
to each QoS class. At the boundary of a DiffServ-enabled domain, the edge routers 
control the traffic entering the network with classification, marking, policing and 
shaping mechanisms. 
 
Flexible QoS Model for MANETs (FQMM) [3] is a model proposed solely for mobile 
ad hoc networks. The FQMM takes the characteristics of MANETs into account and is a 
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hybrid provisioning scheme of the per-flow service in IntServ and the per-class service 
in DiffServ. 
 
While the scalability and flexibility problems in QoS models have drawn extensive 
attention, there has been little work published in the aspect of security - another 
significant issue in MANET QoS models.  
 
The characteristics of ad hoc networks such as exposure to hostile environment (e.g. 
battle field, rescue missions) and difficulty of authentication exacerbate the QoS model 
security problems. Without the protection of security mechanisms, a QoS model is 
vulnerable to both theft of service and denial of service, which inhibits the guarantee of 
network resources availability.  
 
We discuss security issues of the three MANET QoS models. 
 
4.1.1. DiffServ security in MANETs 
 
Several vulnerabilities in DiffServ for MANETs make it a less secure model than the 
IntServ.  
 
First of all, the DiffServ model is based on the trust relationship between edge routers 
and core routers for each DiffServ domain. Functions such as classification, marking, 
policing and shaping are all accomplished at edge routers where the flow enters the 
DiffServ network, while the core routers only forward the packets according to the 
service level marked in the Differentiated Service CodePoint (DSCP) field. As a result, 
if an edge router is compromised and makes malicious alteration on flows, the core 
routers can not find the on-going attacks since they are neither aware of the flow states 
nor do they have the capability of checking the correct DSCP settings in the packets. 
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This assumption of trust relationship is reasonable for the traditional Internet because a 
security domain can be established for each DiffServ domain, where core routers can 
therefore trust the edge routers. A security domain is ‘a set of machines under common 
administrative control, with a common security policy and security level. Hosts in this 
domain place a certain level of trust in the other hosts and may thus provide certain 
services for these trusted hosts which are not available to hosts residing outside of the 
security domain’ [11] . A DiffServ model can take advantage of this trust relationship to 
assure a certain level of security in the DiffServ domain.  
 
However, the situation is different for MANETs. No third party is trustworthy in 
wireless ad hoc networks due to the fact that there is no fixed topology and therefore it is 
difficult and in some circumstances even impossible to establish a security domain in 
MANET environment.  
 
The second vulnerability of the DiffServ model results from the ambiguous definitions 
of edge and core routers for MANETs. Some researchers proposed an architecture in 
which the sending node itself also performs as the ingress edge router and the destination 
node as the egress router [3]. This scheme allows a malicious sender trusted by other 
nodes who does not respect the QoS policy to be able to use as much resources as 
available.  
 
Third, the absence of authorization facilities in ad hoc networks impedes the 
establishment of another line of defense. Because there is no central Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) (e.g. Bandwidth Broker) for the edge routers to consult in a MANET 
DiffServ domain, routers applying incorrect policy can have both unintentional and 
deliberate misbehaviors. 
 
By exploiting the vulnerabilities described above, adversarial nodes can issue attacks in 
two ways. 
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First, illegal promotion of Per-Hop-Behaviors (PHBs), namely a base set of packet 
forwarding rules indicated by the DSCP in the IP packet header, can be accomplished by 
mis-marking the packet or shaping/policing a flow incorrectly at the ingress edge router.  
 
Second, adversaries can steal or deplete the network resources legitimately reserved for 
other users via IP source spoofing.  This form of attack issued in MANETs is more 
deceiving than that in the Internet. Figure 10 illustrates this case. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. An example of theft of service in Diffserv model for MANETs 
 
 
S is sending packets to node D through node R1, R2, R3 and R4. S has legally reserved 
30% bandwidth over the path. Node M is a malicious node who successfully spoofs S’s 
IP address and sends packets through R1, R2, R3 to DM. If M marks its packets with the 
same DSCP value as the packets from S, it could use the reserved bandwidth for S at 
router R1, R2 and R3. Since routers forward packets based on aggregated traffic rather 
than on flows, R1, R2 and R3 would not even notice that the traffic from M is not 
destined to node D. Therefore, node M successfully steals bandwidth from node S, and 
can also affect other traffic at the three core routers. 
 
Besides theft of service, denial of service (DoS) is also a major security risk to ad hoc 
DiffServ networks. DoS on QoS models could be a complete theft of service that is 
launched to penalize legitimate traffic. Similar to theft of service, it can be issued by 
means of IP source spoofing, inappropriate packet marking or erroneous flow policing. 
R4 
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M 
D S 
R2 R3 
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4.1.2. IntServ and FQMM security in MANETs 
 
Compared to the DiffServ model, the IntServ approach does not have the security risks 
mentioned above because it is based on flows rather than on aggregated traffic; 
classification, packet scheduling and admission controls are enforced at each router on 
the path according to the applicable policy, which eliminates the requirement of trust 
relationship among routers as well as the necessity of the central Policy Decision Point. 
Therefore, the IntServ avoids the vulnerabilities in the DiffServ model. 
 
However, IntServ model requires a signaling system to achieve QoS provision along a 
transmit path. Without protection of certain security mechanisms, a QoS signaling 
system could become the target of malicious attacks. We discuss the signaling security 
in details in the next section. 
 
The FQMM is particularly aimed at MANETs. It tries to take advantage of both the per-
flow service granularity in IntServ and the service differentiation in DiffServ model and 
hence inherits the security vulnerabilities of both the IntServ and the DiffServ 
approaches. 
 
4.2. Security Requirements and Attack Models for QoS Signaling Systems in 
MANETs 
 
The most concerned security issues for QoS signaling systems include integrity of the 
signaling packets and genuineness of the network information. In spite of the fact that 
the network state information could be inaccurate in MANETs due to the node mobility 
and rapid topology change, a deliberate distribution of false information will lead to 
more disastrous results. In this section, we analyze the security requirements and attack 
models for QoS signaling systems. 
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4.2.1. Security requirements for QoS signaling systems 
 
Without protection from a security mechanism, attacks on QoS signaling system could 
result in QoS routing malfunction, interference of resource reservation, or even failure of 
QoS provision. The security requirements for QoS signaling systems are as follows: 
 
First, an integrity protection mechanism should be in place to guarantee that the non-
mutable part in the QoS object, such as the QoS profiles for traffic flows, is not changed 
illegally. Illegitimate increase on QoS profile parameters could lead to unnecessary 
reservation for network resources or even failure of reservation in case that the network 
cannot accommodate the amount of service requested incorrectly; while decrease on the 
QoS parameters would affect the QoS provided to the flows because the reserved 
resource might be insufficient for the desired service. 
 
Second, QoS states collected over the path should be resistant to attacks. The 
corresponding QoS parameters (e.g. available bandwidth and accumulative delay over a 
path) measuring these states are mutable at intermediate nodes. The malicious attacks on 
these parts are more deceiving than those on non-mutable parameters because they 
cannot be detected via integrity verification. 
 
For example, in QoS AODV signaling, to determine whether a path can meet the 
required Maximum Delay specification of the QoS data, an intermediate node must 
compare its NODE_TRAVERSAL_TIME to the remaining delay indicated in the 
Maximum Delay Extension. If the delay is less than the NODE_TRAVERSAL_TIME, 
the node must discard the RREQ without processing it any further. Otherwise, the node 
subtracts the NODE_TRAVERSAL_TIME from the delay value and continues 
processing the RREQ. Therefore, the value of the Maximum Permissible Delay field 
should be decreasing during delivery of the RREQ packets, and likewise the values of 
the Maximum Permissible Jitter and Minimum Available Bandwidth should be 
decreasing as well.  
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A mistaken or malicious increase on these values would result in distribution of false 
network state information over the traversed path. A path with insufficient network 
resources could be established and the reservation would finally fail. An attacker who 
wants to disrupt the reservation could decrease the values by an extremely large amount, 
which however would only help the flows to avoid the malicious node. We will not deal 
with this situation in this work. 
 
At last, network resources should be reserved correctly at each node along the path. A 
node should not be able to maliciously break the promise it has made of reserving the 
desired service without being noticed.  
 
4.2.2. Attack models for QoS signaling systems in MANETs 
 
We consider four attack models for QoS signaling system. 
 
Attack model 1: Signaling message spoofing. An adversary can spoof signaling messages 
to request QoS, reserve resources or release resources. Falsified signaling messages can 
be used by illegitimate entity to steal resources, disrupt QoS services, which would 
consequently degrade the network performance. For example, a malicious node M 
spoofs signaling messages using node A’s identification to reserve some resources. Node 
M can use these resources to transmit its own traffic (theft of services); or it can simply 
leave these resources unused so that the resources will not be available to other nodes 
(disruption of services). 
Attack model 2: Denial of QoS request. An adversary can potentially intercept or drop 
reservation messages so that the QoS reservation and the channel setup will be failed or 
tremendously delayed. This attack can prohibit the QoS resources from being available 
to the victim. 
 
Attack model 3: Malicious alteration of non-mutable parameters in transmission. For 
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example, an attacker can change the requested QoS in RREQ packets. It can also 
maliciously alter the QoS reservation parameters in RREP which will result in 
reservation of an incorrect amount of QoS resources.  
 
  
Figure 11. An example of malicious alteration of non-mutable parameters 
 
 
Figure 11 is an example of this attack: node A receives a signaling message from 
originator S to request a reservation of 1.5M bandwidth. Node B is an adversary residing 
adjacent to A on the route who maliciously alters the request for bandwidth to 2M, 
which is larger than the original request value. If the attack is successful, the 
downstream nodes would not be aware of the malicious alteration. Therefore they would 
reserve 2M bandwidth in case that there is 2M bandwidth available at each downstream 
node (case 1 in the figure); or some downstream node will drop the request message in 
case it cannot provide 2M bandwidth (case 2 in the figure), even if it is capable of 
providing 1.5M.  
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If a malicious node decreases the value of the requested resources, it can result in a 
reservation of insufficient resources which can also disrupt the quality of the service 
provided to the flow from originator S. 
 
Attack model 4: Intentional provision of fallacious QoS states information. Although 
QoS states information is subject to errors due to the rapid topology change and high 
node mobility, a deliberate distribution of false information will do more harm to QoS 
provisions. In this type of attacks, an adversary may tamper with the mutable QoS 
parameters (such as ) in signaling messages in order to disrupt the measurement of QoS 
state and provide false information. The attacks may result in failure of resource 
reservation, insufficient or excess reservation. 
 
Figure 12 is an example of this type of attacks on QoS AODV messages.  Originator S 
sends a QoS request for 60 milliseconds (ms) delay. The Maximum Permissible Delay 
(MPD) parameter in the message is used to measure available delay along a candidate 
route. The original value of MPD is the requested delay and it should be decreasing 
downstream along the route. When the message reaches node A, whose traversal time is 
25ms for example, A changes the value MPD parameter from 60 to 35. Suppose node B 
is a malicious node adjacent to node A on the route. Node B is supposed to deduct its 
own value from 35, but instead it increases the value of the parameter to 50ms. This may 
result in successful reservation along the route even if the route can not satisfy the QoS 
request of 60ms delay. In this case, the request of originator S would not be satisfied and 
the service is disrupted. 
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Figure 12. An example of intentional provision of fallacious QoS states information 
 
 
It can be obviously seen that a QoS signaling system is vulnerable to various attacks 
without protection of security mechanisms. 
 
4.3. Security Mechanism for QoS Signaling Systems in MANETs 
 
In wireless ad hoc networks, QoS signaling is likely to be embedded with the routing 
protocols. Secure routing without QoS requirements is not within the scope of this work. 
Because secure routing protocols can be used in our scheme with suitable modification, 
we assume in this dissertation that the routing protocols are reliable and resistant to 
malicious attacks. 
 
4.3.1. Hop-by-hop authentication protocol 
 
In QoS-enabled ad hoc networks, users need to assure the party who sent a signaling 
message is indeed the legitimate party. Otherwise, a malicious node can tamper QoS 
signaling messages with falsified data to steal or deplete resources used or reserved by 
other nodes. These attacks can result in degraded performance of networks, interference 
of resource reservation, unauthorized use of resources, or even failure of QoS provision. 
To thwart these attacks, an authentication protocol needs to be in place to ensure that the 
originator of a packet is the authentic and legitimate node. An authentication protocol 
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should be lightweight and impose as small computational and message overhead as 
possible due to the fact that resources in a mobile ad hoc network are very limited. 
 
The protocol described in the previous section is a lightweight hop-by-hop 
authentication protocol. It utilizes one-way hash chains to compute authentication keys, 
which not only eliminates the high performance overhead imposed by asymmetric 
cryptography (such as digital signatures), but also avoids the difficulty of key 
management introduced by secret paired symmetric key. To generate a key chain of 
length n+1 in a one-way hash chain authentication, the first element of the chain 
(denoted as hn) is randomly picked and then the chain is generated by repeatedly 
applying a one-way function H (hn,  hn-1… ,  h0). A one-way hash function maps an input 
of any length to a fixed-length bit string, which is defined as φ}1,0{}1,0{: * →H , where 
φ is the length of the output of the hash function – the newly generated key. In utilization 
and revelation of these keys, the reverse direction of key generation is used: start from 
h0, the last generated key, and then h1,  … , hn-1 in sequence.  
 
When a node wants to send a message, it computes the MAC on the message and then 
unicast to the receiving node (say node B), or multicast (or broadcast) the packet 
(denoted as PA) to the receivers in the following format: 
 
),(,:(*) AihMMACMBA →  
 
where Aih is the currently used key of node A’s. Note that the key 
A
ih has not been 
disclosed at this point. The originator of the packet (node A in this case) will later 
disclose Aih  in a KEYUPDATE message. The key enables the receiver to verify the 
MAC of the message. If the verification is successful, the message is then authenticated 
and trusted. Once the key is disclosed, it becomes obsolete and can not be used to 
generate MACs any more.   
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This authentication protocol will be used to protect the authenticity of QoS signaling 
messages hop-by-hop. 
 
4.3.2. Basic scheme of the security mechanism for QoS signaling systems  
 
We use end-to-end authentication for the non-mutable parameters in QoS signaling 
messages. Our approach requires the originator or the destination node to digitally sign 
the non-mutable parts of the QoS AODV packets, such as the QoS profile of the flow 
from the originator or the reservation request from the destination. 
 
Before sending a RREQ message, the originator signs the QoS parameters with its 
private key. Each intermediate node on the path can voluntarily verify the digital 
signature to assure that the QoS parameters have not been maliciously altered during 
transmission. After the RREQ reaches the destination node, the destination checks the 
integrity of the non-mutable QoS objects via MAC verification. If the objects have been 
altered during transmission, the destination node will raise an alarm. Otherwise, it 
generates RREP packet, hashes the QoS parameters and sends it back to the originator of 
the request. The originator will verify the authentication and integrity of the QoS 
parameters upon receiving the RREQ packet from the destination.  
 
For the mutable parameters, we will use the hop-by-hop authentication protocol 
described in previous section as our authentication mechanism. Each intermediate node 
generates MACs with its currently used hash chain key and then relays the RREQ packet 
to its adjacent downstream node. After the key is disclosed with a delay since the packet 
has been sent, the downstream node will use the disclosed key to verify authenticity and 
integrity of the parameters. In case that the authentication fails, the node will raise an 
intrusion alarm to its downstream node on the path as well as all the other neighbors. 
This mechanism can prevent spoofing signaling messages and protect legitimate 
signaling messages from in-the-middle attack. 
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To prevent from intentional provision of fallacious QoS states information as 
exemplified in Figure 12, we use a mechanism that works in a similar way to watchdog 
[60], which was proposed to detect routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks. Our 
mechanism requires that each intermediate node on the route send a signaling message 
not only to its downstream neighbor, but also to all the other neighbors. That is, an 
intermediate node is required to broadcast the signaling message instead of unicasting to 
the downstream node.  The upstream node will listen to the broadcast signaling message 
and verify if its neighbor is maliciously distributing false QoS status. 
 
Figure 13 is an example of our intrusion detection scheme. Suppose there exists a path 
between originator S and destination D. Nodes A, B and C are intermediate nodes on the 
route. S wants to send a flow that requires a delay of less than 10 milliseconds and 
therefore sends a RREQ message with value of 10 milliseconds for Maximum 
Permissible Delay parameter. When S initiates the request, it adds the MAC of the 
Maximum Permissible Delay, which is denoted as Ms in Figure 13. When node A 
receives the RREQ packet, it calculates the new delay value and appends the value with 
its MAC of the Maximum Permissible Delay field. Node A will then broadcast the value 
with its MAC to its neighbors so that node S will be able to receive the message and 
verify if the value is reasonable. For example, if the NODE_TRAVERSAL_TIME at A 
is 2 milliseconds, the new delay value sent by A should then be 8 milliseconds. If A 
sends a value that is apparently invalid (such as 10 or larger), node S will raise an 
intrusion alarm. Both S and B will be able to authenticate the message using the later 
disclosed key. 
 
Now we assume node B is a malicious node that is seeking chance to disrupt QoS 
provision. If it raised the delay value from 8 to 12, node A should be able to find out the 
delay has been increased by overhearing B’s signaling message to C.  
 
Our mechanism is also applicable to the Maximum Permissible Jitter and the Minimum 
Available Bandwidth fields. 
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Figure 13. An example of intrusion detection for QoS signaling systems 
 
 
To reduce the delay that our system may impose on the routing, the authentication and 
verification of the QoS values can be achieved offline. That is, an intermediate node can 
forward the RREQ first before it performs the security verification.  
 
Under the circumstance that a node experiences a significant change that keeps it from 
reserving the promised service, it will send an ICMP QOS_LOST message. This could be 
helpful to the observation on a node’s behavior by keeping a record for the nodes who 
have sent the QOS_LOST messages, and therefore help to detect malicious attack. 
 
To prevent a malicious node from acting normal during the QoS signaling but failing to 
keep the promise intentionally, the destination node and volunteer intermediate nodes 
should monitor the flows against the promised QoS level and periodically report to other 
nodes including the originator of the flow.   
 
4.3.3. Enhanced scheme of the security mechanism 
 
Although the “Watchdog” scheme provides prevention for the integrity and authenticity 
of signaling messages and is capable of detecting intentional distribution of false QoS 
states, it is still subject to attacks. If a malicious node (say node B) intentionally sends 
false QoS status to the downstream node C when node A’s radio channel is busy in order 
8/MA   
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12/MB   
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to cause a signal conflict at A, then A will not be able to overhear the fallacious 
information. Later B sends the true information to node A while taking advantage of 
signal conflicts at node C so that node C would not be able to detect that node B sent 
different values. In this case, node A will fail to detect the fallacious QoS information 
distribution. Figure 14 exemplifies this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. An example of intrusion on our security mechanism 
 
 
To solve the problem, we have neighbors of an intermediate node on a data path 
participate in the detection (node E and F in Figure 14). Neighbors E and F are likely to 
hear both two broadcast signaling messages and therefore able to detect B’s misbehavior 
(illustrated in Figure 15). The neighbors could cooperate in the detection for their own 
benefit because: 
 
• A misbehaving node is very likely to issue attacks to disrupt their service as well.  
 
• In MANETs, bandwidth is reserved not only at the relay nodes along the route, but 
also at each relay node’s neighbors. A disruption of QoS provision can also waste the 
neighboring nodes’ resources. 
 
• A credit system can be used to stimulate the cooperation in detection [61].  
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Figure 15. An example of cooperation of neighbors in our security mechanism 
 
 
However, to have neighbors to join in the detection, a security mechanism that provides 
non-repudiation is required. For example, if node E or F detects misbehavior from node 
B, node E or F should give evidence that unambiguously shows that the attack was 
issued by node B and B is not being wrongfully accused. Our hop-by-hop authentication 
only provides non-repudiation of MACs when the key used to generate the MACs have 
not been released. That is, if an accusation of attack with a MAC happened before the 
key is released, the accused will not be able to deny it.  
 
However, we do not want to delay the disclosure of the authentication key to a fairly 
long time later because otherwise the authentication of signaling messages would be also 
tremendously delayed. Moreover, the end-to-end delay of signaling messages would be 
significantly increased in case that a node wants to verify the authenticity before it relays 
the signaling messages. Therefore, we use two MACs for mutable parameters instead of 
just one: one is generated using the key that will be disclosed next; the other is generated 
with the key that will be disclosed after the next one. For example, in Figure 15, node A 
will send the Maximum Permissible Delay parameter, which is 8 ms in our example, 
with a MAC generated with key AiK  (denoted by (8, )AA iM K in Figure 15) and a MAC 
generated with key AiK 1+  (denoted by ),8( 1AiA KM + ). AiK  is the key that is currently used 
and will be disclosed shortly; while AiK 1+  will not be disclosed until some time after AiK is 
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disclosed. Disclosure of AiK  provides timely authentication for signaling messages, and 
delayed disclosure of AiK 1+  provides non-repudiation to neighbors’ detection. 
 
Suppose node B sends a signaling message with different Maximum Permissible Delay 
values to node A and C respectively. The misbehavior will be noticed by node E and/or 
F. Node E and/or F will raise an intrusion alarm with the two messages. The only way 
for B to deny the intrusion is to release the second key ( BjK 1+  in our example) and proves 
that the second MAC of the message is not generated with BjK 1+ . 
B
jK 1+  is authenticated by 
applying HB to BjK . If node B can not prove it, the accusation is successful. 
 
4.4. Security Analysis 
 
Attack model 1: Signaling message spoofing. Our security mechanism uses digital 
signature to protect the authenticity of non-mutable parameters in the signaling messages 
(requested QoS by the originator or the reservation request by the destination).  
 
We also designed a lightweight hop-by-hop authentication protocol to provide 
authenticity to the mutable parameters of signaling messages (measurement of available 
resources along a candidate route). Delayed key disclosure guarantees that a malicious 
node is not able to forge MACs with an already released key.  
 
In our mechanism, as long as the key is not compromised, the identity of a legitimate 
node can not be spoofed by an attacker. In one-way hash chain authentication, we 
choose the function H that is simple to compute, nonetheless is computationally 
infeasible in general to invert. Therefore, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
guess the key based on the already released keys. 
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Attack model 2: Denial of QoS request. A malicious node may intentionally drop QoS 
requests from a specific node in order to prohibit QoS from being available to the victim. 
We use “overhearing” technique in signaling messages relay, therefore an upstream node 
is able to listen if the node has delivered the messages to another node. The upstream 
node may also be able to observe the adjacent node’s traffic and analyze if the drop is 
caused by insufficient resources or malicious intention. 
 
Attack model 3: Malicious alteration of non-mutable parameters in transmission. By 
utilizing digital signature, the non-mutable parameters in QoS request or reservation 
messages can be effectively protected. 
 
Attack model 4: Intentional provision of fallacious QoS states information. To thwart this 
type of attacks, we take advantage of the characteristics of open medium in MANETs in 
our intrusion detection mechanism. An upstream node can detect false QoS state 
information deliberately distributed by its adjacent downstream node. This hop-by-hop 
detection is not only able to detect attacks fast but also capable of locating the malicious 
node on the path, so that the malicious node can be punished or even excluded from the 
network to prevent further attacks. 
 
In our security mechanism, two MACs are used to provide non-repudiation in case 
neighbors want to accuse some node. The approach is based on delayed key disclosure in 
order to prevent in-the-middle attacks. However, the value of the delay is yet to be 
studied to make the mechanism effective (to guarantee non-repudiation) as well as 
efficient (small detection overhead) in the detection. 
 
4.5. Simulation Results 
 
We built our simulation using Network Simulator ns-2 [58]. The AODV simulation is 
part of the simulator. We added delay field according to the model proposed in [60]  in 
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our simulation to serve as QoS field in AODV and then developed our Secure QoS 
Signaling system. We only tested the delay field because the protection of other fields 
such as bandwidth and jitter is the same as that of the delay. We use the MD5 Message 
Digest Algorithm [54] with protection from Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication 
[15] (MD5-HMAC) to generate the MACs. The MAC code from Black’s publication 
[62] is also used in our simulation. We evaluated our system in this chapter based on the 
simulation results. 
 
4.5.1. Simulation setup 
 
Our simulation is based on a 1500 by 300 meters rectangle space. 50 nodes move from a 
random starting position to a random destination with a random speed uniformly 
distributed between 0 to 20 m/sec. The pause time is set to 600 seconds. The Media 
Access Control layer protocol is IEEE 802.11 and the transport protocol is User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), which are available as a part of the simulator. The length of 
data packet is 512 bytes and the traffic sources used are Constant-Bit-Rate (CBR). 
 
We initialized the delay requirement to 300ms, while the NODE_TRAVERSAL_TIME 
is set to 30ms as it is set by default in the AODV part of the simulator. 
 
4.5.2. Performance evaluation 
 
The performance metrics employed to evaluate our system are: message overhead, 
average route request end-to-end delay, average security verification overhead and 
detection accuracy.  
 
1)  Message overhead 
 
This is the number of bits that our security mechanisms introduced on the RREQ 
packets.  
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If the basic security mechanism where cooperation of the neighboring nodes is not used, 
the message overhead introduced by the hashed digest in RREQ packets is 128 bits, 
which is 30.2% of the original QoS AODV packets; while in case that the cooperation of 
neighboring nodes is stimulated, the overhead introduced by the two hashed digest is 
256-bits long, which is 60.4% of the QoS AODV RREQ packets.  
 
2) Average route request hop-to-hop delay  
 
It is the average of the delays incurred by all the route request packets that are 
successfully transmitted hop-by-hop. Because our hashing functions impose delay 
penalty mainly on route requests, we did not include data packets delivery delays into 
our metrics. 
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Figure 16. Average hop-by-hop delay of route request packets 
 
 
We tested scenarios which include 10, 20 and 30 connections respectively. The results of 
the QoS AODV and our security protocol (without neighbor cooperation) are listed in 
Figure 16. From the figure we can see that the delay penalty imposed by our security 
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mechanism is negligible. We also noticed that the delay of our security approach with 
neighbors’ cooperation does not impose any overhead to the delay compared to the basic 
security scheme. The reason for this is because computation of MAC is very fast (around 
0.05ms) therefore it does not affect the route request delay. 
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(a) 50 nodes, 20 source nodes, rate: 4 pkt/sec 
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(b) 50 nodes, pause time: 600s, max speed: 20m/s 
 
Figure 17. Intrusion detection rate for QoS signaling system 
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3) Average security verification overhead 
 
This is the overhead that the security verification introduces, which will not be imposed 
on QoS signaling since it is accomplished offline. The security verification is completed 
approximately in 0.05325 milliseconds at each node in our simulation. 
 
4) Detection rate 
 
This is the ratio of successful detections over total number of misbehaviors. Our 
simulation results (as in Figure 17) show that our enhanced scheme achieves better 
detection rate than the basic scheme. Also, the detection rates increase with increase of 
pause time, while decrease with increase with data rate. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we addressed the security issues for MANET QoS signaling systems. 
Due to the nature of node mobility and the severe overhead imposed on the signaling 
systems, the existing countermeasures to attacks on QoS signaling for the traditional 
Internet cannot be applied to MANET environment. In order to detect misbehaviors on 
QoS signaling, we proposed a Secure Mechanism for QoS Signaling system. Our 
simulation results have demonstrated that the proposed good performance with high 
detection rate and low delay penalty. 
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5. INTRUSION DETECTION FOR BANDWIDTH RESERVATION IN 
MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
 
The security properties that should be supported for QoS in MANET include 
availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality [5]. Availability refers to the 
requirement that the service offered by a node should be available to its users when 
expected. It is a primary security property ensuring soft QoS provision in MANETs. 
Authenticity ensures the principals with whom one interacts are the expected nodes. 
Integrity enforces that a node or message transmitted has not been maliciously altered 
and confidentiality protects the secrecy of communication.  
 
The properties of authenticity, integrity and confidentiality can be protected with 
existing approaches such as encryption and digital signature. However, new security 
mechanisms need to be designed to protect availability property in QoS systems. 
Without protection, QoS systems are vulnerable to various attacks such as Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks and QoS attacks. DoS attacks can cause depletion of memory, 
CPU and network resources, and have been a serious threat for the Internet as well as for 
wireless networks. The aims of a QoS attack include theft of network resources (e.g. 
bandwidth) or degradation of the services perceived by users. Both DoS and QoS attacks 
may result in inaccessibility of network resources and therefore failure in QoS provision.  
 
Several monitoring techniques have been proposed to detect QoS attacks or DoS attacks 
on QoS resources in the Internet [63]. To detect violations on QoS, Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) parameters such as delay, loss and throughput are monitored. 
Throughput measurement is to ensure that no user is consuming excessive bandwidth. In 
these approaches, once service violations are detected, the monitor will alarm for 
bandwidth theft or DoS attacks and then appropriate actions will be taken to eradicate 
the malicious nodes.  
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The approaches of monitoring delay and packet loss can also be used in mobile ad hoc 
networks to detect attacks on these SLA parameters. However, the technique for 
detection on bandwidth reservation (or monitoring throughput) can not be effectively 
applied in MANETs due to the unique characteristics of bandwidth reservation in 
MANETs. 
 
MANETs are characterized by open shared medium, absence of fixed infrastructure and 
rapid topology change. These characteristics determine that providing security protection 
to bandwidth reservation in mobile ad hoc networks is very challenging and different 
from that in the traditional wired networks. First, any channel link of a node is shared 
with all its neighbors5 in MANETs. That is, a node can successfully use the channel only 
when all its neighbors do not transmit and receive packets at the same time, which is 
termed as “aggregation effect” [15]. Therefore, to reserve bandwidth in MANETs, 
available bandwidth needs to be examined and reserved not only at forwarding nodes but 
also at their neighboring nodes. Many new approaches that analyze or implement 
bandwidth reservation have been proposed for mobile ad hoc networks [15] [64] [65]. 
Second, an intrusion can be detected in wired networks in case that the violation of 
bandwidth reservation has exceeded a predefined threshold. In MANETs, however, the 
communication capacity between any two nodes can be dramatically changed due to 
high node mobility, which may result in breaking previously promised bandwidth. That 
is, a violation of the agreement on bandwidth reservation may result from malicious 
attacks as well as non-malicious behaviors (such as a node wandering into the 
neighborhood without knowledge of the reservation, or signal interference from far 
transmission). For this reason, the intrusion detection mechanism for bandwidth 
reservation in MANETs should be able to differentiate misbehaviors from non-malicious 
behaviors. 
 
                                                 
5
 We define neighbors as the nodes that are within the communication range of a node and we assume bi-directional radio links in the 
network. 
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In this chapter, an intrusion detection mechanism will be proposed to detect malicious 
attacks on bandwidth reservation in MANETs. The aim of the detection mechanism is to 
ensure that the bandwidth reserved for a specific traffic flow would not be tampered with 
by a malicious node, who may violate the agreement on bandwidth reservation by 
intentionally preventing reserved bandwidth from being available. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: first we will give a description on 
bandwidth reservation in MANETs and the attack models on the reservation 
mechanisms; the intrusion detection mechanism we designed for bandwidth reservation 
will be discussed later; simulation results will also be demonstrated; then the chapter is 
concluded. 
 
5.1. Bandwidth Reservation and Attack Models in MANETs 
 
Before providing bandwidth guarantees for a traffic flow, the available bandwidth is first 
measured at each intermediate node. To determine whether there is enough bandwidth 
available for a new flow along a candidate data path, each intermediate node’s available 
link capacity and the bandwidth to be consumed by the requesting flow should be 
measured. In the traditional Internet, bandwidth measurement is a trivial task because the 
underlying medium between any two nodes is a point-to-point link with fixed capability. 
However, the problem is complicated in mobile ad hoc networks due to the fact that 
communication links in MANETs are open medium and the radio channel of a node is 
shared with all its neighbors. In MANETs, a node can successfully use the channel only 
when all its neighbors do not transmit and receive packets at the same time. Under this 
effect, a node cannot use specific bandwidth simultaneously with any of its neighbors 
except for the receiving node, who will be listening to the channel during the 
transmission. Consequently, to determine whether there is sufficient resource for a QoS 
request in a mobile ad hoc network, a node needs to know its own available bandwidth 
as well as the available bandwidth at all its neighbors. Moreover, the bandwidth should 
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be reserved not only at each intermediate node (or forwarding node6) on a forwarding 
path, but also at all the neighbors of the intermediate node.  
 
Figure 18 shows an example of aggregation effect in which a flow originated from node 
S traverses a forwarding node F and is destined to node D. When node F is receiving or 
transmitting packets, its neighbors A, B, C and E should remain silence because 
otherwise it may cause conflict, in which case the receiving and transmission would fail.  
 
Suppose node S sends a QoS request for bandwidth reservation. The bandwidth should 
be reserved not only at F, but also at A, B, C and E, in that it needs to guarantee that 
there is sufficient bandwidth available at the entire neighborhood of F in order to 
provide successful bandwidth reservation. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. An example of aggregation effect in delivery of packets 
 
 
In both MANETs and the Internet, bandwidth reservation is achieved by reserving 
specific time slots or sessions with the forwarding nodes (as well as neighbors of 
forwarding nodes’ in case of mobile ad hoc networks). In this work, we do not assume 
any specific bandwidth reservation protocols on the Medium Access Control (MAC) 
layer or any specific routing protocols on the network layer. Our intrusion detection 
                                                 
6
 Henceforth, we will use the terms “intermediate nodes” and “forwarding nodes” interchangeably.  
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mechanism for bandwidth reservation can be an independent additional layer above the 
network layer, as illustrated in Figure 19.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Integration of our detection mechanism in the OSI model 
 
 
5.1.1. Attack models for bandwidth reservation in MANETs 
 
Due to the characteristics of bandwidth reservation in MANETs, the reservation is 
vulnerable to various attacks. The attacks can be launched not only from forwarding 
nodes on the data path, but also from the neighbors of the forwarding nodes. Besides, 
because the medium is open and shared, malicious nodes do not even need to obtain 
physical access to a node or a channel to launch successful attacks. There are two attack 
models for bandwidth reservation in MANETs: 
 
Attack model 1:  DoQoS. Since bandwidth needs to be reserved at all the neighbors of a 
forwarding node, the neighbors should keep silence during the reserved time-slots or 
sessions once a reservation has been established. A malicious neighboring node may 
intentionally break previous reservation by transmitting signals during the reserved 
slot/session, which will cause signal collision and consequently failure of QoS provision. 
The objectives of this type of attack include disruption of bandwidth reservation 
(illustrated in Figure 20 (a)), or theft of reserved bandwidth to be used for other traffic 
Transport layer 
 Detection 
mechanism 
 Network layer 
 MAC layer 
 Physical layer 
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flows (in Figure 20 (b), M sending to C which causes conflict at B). Both these two 
attacks result in Denial of QoS (DoQoS) for the reserving flow. 
 
               
(a) An example of disruption of bandwidth 
reservation attack 
(b) An example of theft of bandwidth attack
 
Figure 20. An example of DoQoS attack in bandwidth reservation 
 
 
It’s worth mentioning that an attacker may send packets with falsified source address or 
simply transmit deteriorated packets or noisy signals so that other nodes would not be 
able to detect the source of the intrusion. 
 
Attack model 2: QoS attacks. A selfish or malicious node on the data path may 
intentionally break the promise of bandwidth reservation. This type of attack includes 
two cases:  (1) A malicious node may refuse to forward the packets during the reserved 
slots/sessions, simply leaving the bandwidth unused and wasted. The attacker may 
intend to disrupt the QoS, or may just be selfish trying to save its resources such as 
energy. (2) An attacker may use the bandwidth to deliver other flows such as its own 
traffic or traffic from which it would earn more profit. We call this type of attack as theft 
of bandwidth (or theft of service). This scenario is different from DoQoS attacks in that 
the packets received are characterized as undeteriorated.  
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5.2. Intrusion Detection on Bandwidth Reservation in MANETs 
 
5.2.1. Assumptions 
 
We assume that the network topology is fairly stable, or not changing so rapidly that 
may consequently cause failure of QoS provisioning. Specifically, if a node has 
promised QoS for a flow, it would not move out of the transmission range of its 
upstream and downstream nodes during the reserved time duration7.  
 
We assume that a node is able to estimate its current battery level and expected energy 
consumption before accepting a reservation. A benign node would not accept a QoS 
reservation if its energy level does not allow itself to provide the requested QoS during 
the reservation time duration. Therefore, we do not differentiate the case of exhausted 
battery from intrusion in our detection. It is also assumed that a node is able to predict its 
moving speed and estimate its position on the path. A benign forwarding node would not 
make a reservation if it is moving out of the transmission range of its upstream node and 
downstream node on the data path during the reserved duration. In reality, an unexpected 
event such as power failure due to mobility can happen to benign nodes. In such cases, 
reputation systems [66][67][68] can be used to evaluate the behaviors and to detect 
intrusions.  
 
5.2.2. Intrusion detection mechanism 
 
Our mechanism is composed of two modules: monitor module and detection module. 
We use hop-by-hop monitoring and detection. Specifically, the receiving node monitors 
and detects misbehaviors from the transmitting node. During the reserved time duration, 
the monitor module on a receiving node monitors the throughput with which its 
                                                 
7
 Reserved duration refers to the time period during which the reservation is valid; while the reserved slot or session refers to the 
time division that the transmission for the flow according to different MAC protocols. 
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upstream transmitting node has delivered the reserving flow (see Figure 21 (a)). Here we 
detect violations on bandwidth reservation by observing the transmitting node’s 
throughput. The throughput is used to calculate the bandwidth that the transmitting node 
has used in transmitting the packets. If the bandwidth actually used is less than the 
reserved bandwidth and the violation exceeds a threshold (i.e. ε≥v , where v denotes 
the violation and ε denotes the threshold), it will notify the detection module and the 
detection process will be launched. The aim of the detection module is to determine 
whether the violation is caused by malicious behaviors. DoQoS and QoS attacks will be 
differentiated in the detection. When the detection finishes, the status will return to 
“monitor” no matter whether an intrusion alarm has been issued or not, as illustrated in 
Figure 21 (b). 
 
 
Figure 21. Roles of the nodes and components of the detection mechanism 
 
 
In our intrusion detection, QoS attacks are identified with upstream node sending other 
flows (theft of service) or received power R at the receiving node lower than a 
predefined threshold tR (bandwidth unused); while DoQoS attacks are identified with the 
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signal strength received at the receiving node exceeding the estimated maximum 
interference but no new neighbor has been detected.  
 
Figure 22 demonstrates the process of the intrusion detection. The procedure will return 
to the monitor module when it finishes. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Pseudo code of the intrusion detection algorithm 
 
 
In Figure 22, tR denotes the threshold which is the minimum power needed to receive a 
flow with the reserved bandwidth in case of no signal transmission interference. If the 
transmitting node has not sent signals with the power strong enough to be received even 
when there is no interference, it is apparently issuing a QoS attack. We use the Shannon- 
Hartley formula to calculate the threshold tR. The formula is:  
 
)/(log)/1(log 22 NRBNSBC =+=   (1) 
Procedure IntrusionDetection ( ) 
Input: Received power R, minimum used bandwidth tR, Estimated maximum 
interference E[Imax]   
Output: Alarm of DoQoS or QoS attacks, or No alarm 
Begin 
    If undeteriorated packets for other flows received 
     Then return QoS_Attack_Alarm 
    Else  
       If received power R <= tR + λ1 
 
        Then return QoS_Attack_Alarm 
       Else 
          If received power R >= E[Imax]  + λ2 
             If new neighbor(s) detected 
        Then  Begin 
Negotiate with the new neighbors 
return no alarm  
            End 
              Else 
   return DoQoS_Attack_Alarm 
     return no alarm 
End. 
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where C is the capacity in bits per second, B is the bandwidth of the channel in Hertz, 
and S/N is the signal-to-noise ratio. The capacity C is the theoretical maximum rate of 
clean data of the channel. If we let C be the reserved bandwidth, B be the raw data rate 
of the channel, and Nt be the thermal noise in the environment, then R will be the 
minimum power threshold that is needed to transmit the flow, i.e. raw
rsvd
B
B
tR Nt 2∗= . 
 
E[Imax] denotes the estimated maximum interference in a benign environment without 
denial of service. If the signal interference calculated, based on measurement of the 
throughput, is larger than E[Imax], we can conclude that there is a DoQoS attack. 
 
λ1 and λ2 are the security factors used to adjust the detection. In case that better detection 
rate are desired other than better false alarm rate, we should take a larger value for λ1 as 
compared to a smaller value for λ2; and vice versa. 
 
5.2.3. Estimation of interference 
 
From the intrusion detection algorithm, it is obvious that the accuracy of the values tR 
and E[Imax] may significantly affect the intrusion detection rate and false alarm rate. To 
estimate the maximum interference, we use one-dimensional Kalman filtering technique. 
The technique not only guarantees a high level of prediction accuracy by filtering out 
measurement errors as well as by preserving the quick changes in interference power, 
but also achieves low computation overhead. 
 
The operation assumptions for the wireless networks under consideration are as follows: 
 
• It is assumed that a radio channel in a TMDA network is used, where time is 
divided into slots or sessions. These slots or sessions are reserved under 
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medium access control (MAC) protocol for a specific flow. During the reserved 
slots or sessions, only the transmitting node of the flow is allowed to send data 
onto the given channel and all nodes should keep silent. Multiple contiguous 
time slots or sessions can be used by the same transmitter for sending a data 
burst.  
 
• Interference power in each time slot or session can be easily calculated, but 
with errors at each receiver. The interference power refers to the difference 
between the total received power and the power of the signal sent within the 
reserved slots or sessions, which is calculated based on the throughput and the 
total received power using Shannon-Hartley theory. 
 
1) Kalman filters 
 
Kalman filter is a recursive data processing algorithm with the purpose of estimating the 
state of a system from measurements which contain random errors [69]. The filter 
processes all available measurements in estimation of the current value of the variables, 
regardless of the precision of the measurements. It uses knowledge of the following 
aspects: 
 
• Knowledge of the system and measurement device dynamics; 
 
• The statistical description of the system noises, measurement errors, and 
uncertainty in the dynamics models; 
 
• Any available information about initial conditions of the variables of interest. 
 
There are three basic assumptions in the Kalman filter formulation:  
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• The system can be described with a linear model. Suppose the values of the 
variable we want to estimate at certain times t0, t1, t2, etc are 0x , 1x , 2x , etc. 
Then the value 1k +x at time tk+1 can be represented with a linear dynamic 
equation: kkk wxx +=+1 . 
 
• The system and measurement noises are white and Gaussian.  That is, the 
noise is not correlated in time and the mean of the noise is zero.  
 
The measurement value of kx can be denoted as kkk vxz +=  (where kv denotes the 
measurement noise). Under these three assumptions, the Kalman filter can be shown to 
be the best filter of any conceivable form.  
 
By the Kalman filter theory [69], the time update equations are: 
kk xx ˆ
~
1 =+        (2) 
kkk QPP +=+ ˆ~ 1       (3) 
 
And the measurement update equations are: 
1]~[~ −+= kkkk RPPK       (4) 
][~ˆ kkkkk xzKxx −+=      (5) 
kkk PKP
~]1[ˆ −=       (6) 
 
where kx and ˆ kx are the a priori and a posteriori estimates of kx respectively, kP and 
ˆ
kP are the a priori and a posteriori estimate-error variances, kK is the Kalman gain, 
and kQ and kR are the covariance matrices for the process noise kw and measurement 
noise kv respectively. 
 
 For more details about Kalman filter, see [69], [70] and [71]. 
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2) Estimation of signal interference using Kalman filter 
 
By the Kalman filter theory, it is assumed in our estimation that:  
 
• The signal interferences at certain times when we want to estimate can be 
described with a linear system, such as: 1k k kx xφ ω+ = + . kω is the process 
noise at time tk.  
 
• The process and measurement noises on signal interferences are white and 
Gaussian. 
 
Actually in this detection scheme, the signal interference is not measured directly but 
calculated based on the measurement of the throughput and the total received power 
during the reserved time slots or sessions. According to the Shannon-Hartley theorem, 
the calculated signal interference at time tk is: 
BC
k
k k
R
x /2
=  
where Rk is the total received power at time tk, while Ck is the throughput or capacity of 
the channel on the flow at time tk. Please note that, using the Shannon-Hartley theorem, 
we are assuming that this Ck (or capacity) is actually the theoretical maximum capacity. 
Therefore the calculated interference, xk, should be smaller than the real interference 
strength, and this may affect the detection rate of our intrusion detection mechanism. 
 
We assume that the measurement on the throughput is accurate (this assumption is 
reasonable because the throughput can be easily measured at the receiving node) and that 
the measurement noises on the total received power are white and Gaussian, it can be 
proved that the measurement noises on the signal interference are white and Gaussian as 
well. 
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The process of applying Kalman filter on estimate of signal interferences is illustrated in 
Figure 23. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Application of Kalman filter on estimate of signal interferences 
 
 
 
We use one-dimensional Kalman filter to estimate the signal interference at time tk. 
According to the theory, the estimation algorithm is as follows: 
 
System error 
sources 
System 
Interference 
state 
Measuring 
devices 
Observed 
measurements: 
throughput; 
total power 
Kalman 
filter 
Estimate of 
interference 
Measurement 
error sources 
controls 
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Figure 24. Estimate algorithm of signal interferences 
 
 
In Figure 24, 2( )P p=  and 2( )R r= are the respective variances for the changes of 
interference power (or process noises) and the interference measurement error. In our 
initialization, we obtain the initial value of process noise σ by using measurement in a 
sliding window of W slots. We obtain the average changes of interference power from 
one time slot to the next by 
 
1
1
1 k
k l l
l k WW
σ σ σ
−
= − +
= −    (7) 
 
Then the approximated variance of process noise is 
 
2 2
1
1
1 [( ) ]
1
k
l l k
l k W
P
W
σ σ σ σ
−
= − +
= = − −
−
  (8) 
Initialization:  22 ; piσ == RP   
 
For t = 0 : dt : duration 
Begin 
Take input of the measurement: 
R = received power; C = throughput/dt; 
BC
R
z /2
=     %interference measurement 
Recalculate P using (7); 
;Inn z xhat= −    %innovation 
;S P R= +     %covariance of innovation 
1* ;k P S=     %Kalman filter 
* ;xhat xhat k Inn= +    % a posteriori estimate of interference 
[1 ] (1 ) ;P k P k P= − = −    %covariance of prediction error 
End. 
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Note that lσ includes the interference measurement errors r, which have a Gaussian 
distribution with zero mean. Therefore, W should be large enough (e.g. 1000W ≥ ) to 
give an unbiased estimate of average changes of interference power in consecutive time 
slots.  
 
The variance of the interference measurement error R depends on the noise level and the 
error characteristics of the measurement circuit in use. In practice, the initial value of 
2( )R pi= can be determined by measuring the “received” power on an idle channel with 
known thermal noises. Therefore, the variance of the “received” power over a time 
window can serve as an estimate of 2pi . 
 
3) Some discussions on the estimation  
 
There is such possibility that the measurement noise power level is not constant or the 
noise is actually time correlated. But in these instances, a white noise put through a small 
linear system can duplicate virtually any form of time-correlated noise. This system, 
called a “shaping filter,” can then be added to the original system to achieve an overall 
linear system driven by white noise once again. 
 
In a real network, the signal interferences may not only come from far transmissions, but 
also from the thermal noises at the background. This is one of the main causes for the 
measurement noises. 
 
Some researchers proposed two-dimensional Kalman filter to estimate signal 
interferences. In the approach of estimation with two-dimensional filter, the number of 
co-channel interferers is also considered to enhance the accuracy of interference power 
prediction. We argue that two-dimensional filter may improve the accuracy of estimation 
in some circumstances, but it certainly introduces much more computational overhead 
than the one-dimensional filter technique that is proposed in this chapter. Moreover, the 
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number of interferers is very difficult to predict at any time in that it is correlated to the 
node mobility pattern in the vicinity as well as their traffic patterns, which is the 
information that is hard for a node to obtain.  
 
5.3. Simulation and Performance Analysis 
 
We can see from the design of the detection mechanism that use of the Shannon-Hartley 
theorem (Equation (1)) and the interference estimation approach using Kalman filter has 
significant impact on the performance of the detection mechanism. Therefore, we first 
do some simulation to evaluate the errors in using Shannon-Hartley theorem and the 
interference estimation. Then we conduct performance analysis of our detection 
mechanism based on simulation. We still use ns-2 to investigate the performance of the 
proposed approaches.  
 
Our simulation is based on a 1500 by 300 meters rectangle space. 50 nodes move from a 
random starting position to a random destination with a random speed uniformly 
distributed between 0 to 20 m/sec. The pause time is set to 600 seconds.  
 
The channel capacity of mobile hosts is set to the same value: 2 Mbps. We assume all 
nodes have the same transmission range of 250 meters at the beginning of the simulation. 
Their transmission ranges afterwards depend on their remaining battery level. Two-ray 
ground reflection model is used as the channel model. 
 
5.3.1. Performance analysis on use of Shannon-Hartley theorem and evaluation on 
interference estimation 
 
We evaluate our interference estimation algorithm by simulation. To evaluate the 
algorithm separately from the Shannon-Hartley theorem, we remove the use of Shannon-
Hartley in the algorithm. Instead, we use the real interference value in the algorithm to 
replace the “interference measurement” with Shannon-Hartley theorem.  
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Figure 25. Average estimated capacity (real capacity: 2Mbps) 
 
 
In our simulation, we set the real bandwidth as 2Mbps. The simulation results are shown 
in Figure 25. We found that with increase of the packet rate, the estimated capacity is 
closer to the real capacity value. That is, the accuracy increases when the data packet 
rate increases.  This may be caused by decreased signal-to-noise value in the theorem. 
 
We calculate the accuracy of the interference estimation as
real
realestimated −
−1 , where 
“estimated” denotes “estimated interference value” and “real” denotes “real interference 
value”. The simulation results are demonstrated in Figure 26. 
 
We can see from Figure 26 that the accuracy of the estimation algorithm decreases with 
increase of the data packet rate. This may result from the fact that the deviation of the 
interference or noise strength increases when the traffic load increases in the network. 
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Figure 26. Accuracy of the interference estimation algorithm 
 
 
5.3.2. Performance evaluation on the intrusion detection mechanism 
 
We simulate DoQoS and QoS attacks in separate scenarios. For any given scenario, we 
run the simulation for 40 minutes to get the data. For the first 250 seconds, each node 
collects the data of interference power every 250ms during 1000 time slots (W=1000) to 
calculate the initial value of process noise by feeding the data into formulae (6) and (7). 
Then we use the remaining time to simulate the attacks and to test our approaches. 
 
At the beginning of the simulation, we randomly pick a node as the malicious node, who 
continuously sends packets regardless of legal traffic from other nodes. During the 
simulation, we also randomly select a node in the attacker’s neighborhood as the 
receiving node, whose receiving will be affected by the attacker’s malicious behaviors. 
Then the receiving node will conduct the detection. When the attacker or the receiving 
node moves out of the neighborhood, new receiving node will be randomly selected. The 
packet rate of the malicious node is always the same as the packet rate of the legal flow.  
 
  
102 
 
Because thermal noises are not simulated in the simulator (i.e. tR = 0), we use the value 
of the adjustment factor for QoS attack detection λ1 as the QoS attack detection threshold, 
and set λ1 as the minimum signal interference that has been collected during the first 250 
seconds from calculation of the initial process noise: 
)(min
1000,...,2,11 jj
σλ
=
=  
We set the second security factor as zero, i.e. 2 0λ = . 
 
We use the following two metrics to evaluate the performance of the intrusion detection 
mechanism: 
 
Detection rate: It is defined as the proportion of the number correct alarms of malicious 
attacks to the total number of alarms that should be reported. 
 
Figure 27 demonstrated the detection rates for DoQoS and QoS attacks respectively.  
 
From Figure 25, Figure 26 and Figure 27 (a), we observe that the detection rate of 
DoQoS is significantly affected by the interference estimation algorithm. The detection 
rate does not fit the trend of the accuracy in calculation with Shannon-Hartley theorem. 
The reason may be that the interference is estimated based on the values that are also 
calculated with the Shannon-Hartley theorem and therefore the accuracy of the 
calculation is not reflected in the detection. 
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(a) Detection rate for DoQoS attacks 
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(b) Detection rate for QoS attacks 
Figure 27.  Detection rate for DoQoS and QoS attacks 
 
 
False positive rate: It is defined as the percentage of decisions in which benign 
behaviors are flagged as anomalous. We evaluate this metrics by simulating the 
environment where there does not exist any malicious node. 
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Figure 28. False positive rate for DoQoS attack detection 
 
 
Figure 28 demonstrates the false positive rates for DoQoS attack detection. The false 
positive rates for QoS attack detection are always below 0.22%. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
MANETs are vulnerable to QoS and DoQoS attacks due to the characteristics of open 
shared medium and network topology change. In this chapter, we propose a security 
mechanism to detect intrusions on bandwidth reservation in MANETs.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
MANETs are characterized by the absence of fixed infrastructure, rapid topology change 
and high node mobility. These characteristics impose tremendous difficulty on design 
and implementation of security mechanisms that provide security protection or intrusion 
detection.  
 
Security is a critical issue and offers serious challenges in QoS provisioning in wireless 
ad hoc networks. Without protection from security mechanisms, a QoS system is 
vulnerable to various malicious attacks.  Yet there is little work published in this area up 
to date. 
 
This research has filled in this blank via providing security mechanisms that can prevent 
MANET QoS mechanisms from being tampered by malicious adversaries. The 
approaches such as intrusion prevention and intrusion detection have been applied to 
guarantee an advanced security level. 
 
6.1. Contributions 
 
In this dissertation, we have addressed security issues for QoS systems in Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks. We have designed a secure QoS system to prevent from or detect various 
malicious attacks from different aspects. The security mechanisms we designed can be 
utilized to preserve protected information and network resources, therefore can protect 
QoS from being tampered with by adversaries.   
 
The major contributions of this research include: 
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6.1.1. A lightweight authentication protocol for MANETs  
 
We have proposed a lightweight authentication protocol that can effectively and 
efficiently provide security properties such as authenticity and integrity for 
communicating neighbor nodes in MANETs. The protocol utilizes one-way hash chains 
to compute authentication keys, which not only eliminates the high performance 
overhead imposed by asymmetric cryptography (such as digital signatures), but also 
avoids the difficulty of key management introduced by secret paired symmetric key. The 
protocol also used delayed key disclosure to prevent a malicious entity from forging 
packets with Message Authentication Codes (MACs) with an already released key. The 
authentication protocol is lightweight, scalable and tolerant of packet loss. The 
performance analysis showed that the protocol incurs low overhead penalty and also 
achieves a tradeoff between security and performance. 
 
6.1.2. Security in QoS models and signaling systems for MANETs  
 
In this dissertation, we analyzed the vulnerabilities and types of security violations for 
MANET QoS models, which include IntServ model, Diffserv model and the Flexible 
QoS Model for MANETs (FQMM). The analysis demonstrated that DiffServ and 
FQMM are vulnerable to attacks such as theft and depletion of network resources. 
Compared to the DiffServ model, the IntServ approach does not have the security risks 
mentioned above because it is based on flows rather than on aggregated traffic as in 
DiffServ and FQMM. However, IntServ model requires a signaling system to achieve 
QoS provision along a data path. Without protection of certain security mechanisms, a 
QoS signaling system can still become the target of malicious attacks. 
 
In order to detect and prevent from misbehaviors on QoS signaling systems, we have 
proposed a Secure Mechanism for QoS Signaling system in MANETs. In this 
dissertation, we have proposed a security mechanism for MANET QoS signaling 
systems. The mechanism is able to efficiently detect intrusions on QoS parameters 
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transmitted over a path in the absence of adjacent colluding nodes. The simulation 
results have demonstrated that the proposed system achieved good performance with 
fairly high detection rate and low delay penalty. 
 
6.1.3. Intrusion detection for bandwidth reservation in MANETs 
 
In the traditional Internet, if the violation on bandwidth reservation exceeds a predefined 
threshold, we can conclude that an intrusion has happened. In MANETs, however, due 
to the characteristic of high node mobility and dramatic capacity change on 
communication links, a node can only promise not to deliberately oversubscribe itself 
and not to intentionally prevent the resources from being available. QoS cannot be 
guaranteed and a break of QoS promise can result from malicious attacks as well as 
radio interference from the nodes who just “wandered” into the neighborhood unaware 
of the reservation. Moreover, communication links in MANETs are open medium and 
therefore subject to radio interference. Detection of intrusion on bandwidth reservation 
needs to distinguish these cases and apparently is not a trivial task.  
 
We designed an algorithm to detect both DoS attacks (issued by malicious nodes in the 
neighborhood to disrupt the service), and QoS attacks (issued by relay node on the path 
to disrupt the service or to steal the bandwidth). Simulation and performance evaluation 
of the algorithm are also demonstrated. 
 
6.2. Future Work 
 
At this point, we have focused on intrusion detection for bandwidth reservation. Besides 
bandwidth, an adversary can also target other Quality of Service parameters (such as 
delay and jitter), which will also cause violation of reserved QoS. In the future, we will 
design security techniques to thwart this type of attacks. The technique to detect service 
violation on delay or jitter may require an upstream node selectively promiscuously 
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listen to the downstream nodes and monitor whether the downstream node is providing 
promised QoS. 
 
In the design of the lightweight authentication protocol, we used delayed key disclosure 
to prevent malicious entities from forging packets with Message Authentication Codes 
using an already released key. The impact of the delayed key disclosure on the 
authentication will be analyzed in the future. In addition, an algorithm to determine the 
value of key disclosure delay is also worth further investigation.  
  
Our future research direction also includes the implementation of the secure QoS system 
that we have proposed in a real mobile ad hoc network and to evaluate its performance 
in the real world.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
The simulation model for the authentication protocol that we presented in Chapter III 
and the data we obtained in the simulation are described in this appendix. 
 
The routing protocol we used in our simulation is AODV. The Medium Access Control 
(MAC) protocol is IEEE 802.11 and the Transportation layer protocol is User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP), which are both available as a part of the simulator. The size of data 
packets is 512 bytes the traffic sources are Constant-Bit-Rate (CBR). We assume all the 
nodes have the same initial transmission range of 250 meters.  
 
 In our simulation, all traffic is generated and the statistical data are collected after a 
warm-up time of 100 seconds in order to allow the network to finish initialization 
process. 
 
The data for our simulation are shown in Table A-1 through A-6. 
 
Table A-1 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 6, which presents the resent rate 
of the KEYUPDATE messages. 
 
Table A-1. Data for “resent rate of KEYUPDATE messages”  
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
Resent Percentage 
(%) 
Deviation (%) 
2 2.29619 0.40325 
4 2.88991 0.4218 
6 3.05035 0.71746 
8 3.19447 0.72237 
10 3.41463 0.75306 
 
 
Table A-2 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 7 (a) , which presents the 
average hop-by-hop delay in the scenario of 9 nodes (Scenario 1 described in the 
chapter). 
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Table A-2. Data for “average hop-by-hop delay: scenario of 9 nodes” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
Average hop-by-hop 
delay (sec) deviation 
2 0.006028 1.25E-06 
6 0.006958 7.05E-06 
4 0.007004 7.55E-06 
8 0.007704 1.38E-05 
10 0.008237 2.20E-05 
 
Table A-3 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 7 (b), which presents the 
average hop-by-hop delay in the scenario of 50 nodes (Scenario 2 described in the 
chapter). 
 
Table A-3. Data for “average hop-by-hop delay: scenario of 50 nodes” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
Average hop-by-hop 
delay (sec) deviation 
2 0.028315 0.005089 
6 0.18477 0.167415 
4 0.32784 0.300454 
8 0.364751 0.334491 
10 0.373874 0.364128 
 
 
Table A-4 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 8, which presents the 
percentage of packets arriving safely. 
 
Table A-5 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 9 (a), which presents the 
average dropped packet rate, with a cache of 16 packets size. 
 
Table A-6 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 9 (b), which presents the 
average dropped packet rate, with a cache of 32 packets size. 
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Table A-4. Data for “Percentage of packets arriving safely” 
Packet rate 
Key  
disclosure  
delay (sec) 2 pkt/sec 4 pkt/sec 6 pkt/sec 8 pkt/sec 10 pkt/sec 
0.2 98.6113 73.4077 61.5724 55.4833 55.9702 
0.4 99.5772 85.454 75.0691 68.2309 68.7154 
0.6 99.8411 91.1112 82.4131 75.8788 76.2754 
0.8 99.9129 93.9528 86.7979 81.6012 81.7163 
1 99.9462 95.5906 89.8889 85.3947 85.5514 
1.2 99.9744 96.6865 92.1106 88.3968 88.3224 
1.4 99.9949 97.3764 93.7613 90.6632 90.4576 
1.6 100 97.9003 94.9893 92.406 92.2446 
1.8 100 98.3402 95.9775 93.7332 93.7527 
2.0 100 98.6862 96.737 94.8168 94.8451 
2.2 100 98.9062 97.4068 95.6151 95.6622 
2.4 100 99.0601 97.8954 96.25 96.2804 
2.6 100 99.1741 98.2395 96.7787 96.8417 
2.8 100 99.2861 98.4975 97.2031 97.2449 
3.0 100 99.4001 98.686 97.6188 97.6517 
 
Table A-5. Data for “average dropped packet rate, cache size: 16 pkt”  
Disclosure delay 
 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
3 sec 
(%) 
2 sec 
(%) 
2 37.8599 6.7898 
4 53.2993 29.9489 
6 56.6632 34.9948 
8 58.1664 37.2497 
10 59.4185 39.1278 
 
Table A-6. Data for “average dropped packet rate, cache size: 32 pkt”  
Disclosure delay 
 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
3 sec 
(%) 
2 sec 
(%) 
2 0 0 
4 6.5985 0 
6 13.3263 0 
8 16.3329 0 
10 18.8371 0 
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APPENDIX B 
 
The data for the signaling security mechanism that we presented in Chapter IV are 
described in this appendix.  
 
We use the same simulation model that is used in Chapter III and described in Appendix 
A. We added a delay field to the AODV model to simulate the part of the QoS AODV 
protocol that is related to the performance evaluation on our mechanism. 
 
Table B-1 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 16, which presents the average 
RREQ hop-by-hop delay. 
 
Table B-1. Data for “average RREQ hop-by-hop delay” 
Number of 
connections 
AODV with delay 
field (ms) 
Deviation 
(ms) 
Security 
QoS (ms) 
Deviation 
(ms) 
10 9.023 0.98442 9.981 0.87649 
20 10.001 0.98736 11.639 0.93208 
30 11.475 0.98609 12.719 0.98214 
 
Table B-2 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 17 (a), with 50 nodes, 20 
maximum connections and packet rate of 4 pkt/sec. 
 
Table B-2. Data for “Intrusion detection rate for QoS Signaling system, 50-20-4” 
Pause time 
(sec) 
Basic 
scheme deviation 
Enhanced 
scheme deviation 
200 0.764 0.054 0.933 0.004 
400 0.837 0.049 0.975 0.001 
600 0.841 0.049 0.985 0.001 
 
Table B-3 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 17 (b), with 50 nodes, 20 
maximum connections and 600 seconds of pause time. 
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Table B-3. Data for “Intrusion detection rate for QoS Signaling system, 50-600-20” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) Basic scheme deviation 
Enhanced 
scheme deviation 
4 0.841 0.032 0.985 0.014 
8 0.804 0.0318 0.945 0.026 
10 0.781 0.0455 0.944 0.011 
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APPENDIX C 
 
The simulation model and parameters we used in Chapter V is summarized in Table C-1. 
 
Table C-1. Simulation setup and parameters for bandwidth reservation intrusion detection 
Area  1500x300(m2) 
Propagation model  Two-ray ground reflection model 
MAC protocol  IEEE802.11 with modification  
Routing protocol  AODV 
Initial Transmission range  250m 
Node max speed  20m/s 
Node pause time  60sec 
Traffic type  UDP 
Estimation initialization  W=1000, dt = 250ms 
Security factors 
 1 1,2,...,1000
min ( )jjλ σ== , 2 0λ =  
Misbehavior (DoQoS)  sends packets regardless of reservation 
Misbehavior (QoS)  Leaves the bandwidth unused 
 
The IEEE 802.11 protocol was modified to simulate bandwidth reservation. We make all 
the neighbors of the transmitting node and receiving node to keep silent during the 
simulation time, except for the attacker. 
 
The two-ray ground reflection model is used to predict the received power based on the 
transmitted power and the distance of two nodes. The model is implemented in the ns-2 
simulator. The model uses Friss-space attenuation ( 21
r
) at near distances and an 
approximation to Two ray Ground ( 41
r
) at far distances. The approximation assumes 
reflection off a flat ground plane. In the model, a cross-over distance rc is first 
calculated:  
 
(4 ) /c t rr h hpi λ=  
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where ht and hr are the heights of the transmission and receive antennas respectively, and 
 is the wavelength. 
 
Then if r < rc, the received power is: 
 
2
2 2Pr( ) (4 )
t t rPG Gr
d L
λ
pi
=  
 
If r < rc,, the received power at distance r is: 
 
2 2
4( ) t t r t rr
PG G h hP r
r L
=  
 
where Pt is the transmitted signal power, Gt and Gr are the antenna gains of the 
transmitter and the receiver respectively. L (L  1) is the system loss. We use all the 
default values in ns-2:  Gt = Gr = 1, ht = hr = 1.5 (m), L =1,  = 0.32823. 
 
Table C-2 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 25, which presents the average 
estimated capacity with Shannon-Hartley theorem. The real capacity is 2Mbps. 
 
Table C-2. Data for “average estimated capacity using Shannon-Hartley theorem” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
Estimated 
capacity(Mbps) deviation 
1 6.102 2.215 
2 5.754 2.109 
3 5.672 2.183 
4 5.003 2.276 
5 5.075 2.602 
6 4.088 3.022 
7 3.826 3.199 
8 3.251 3.074 
9 3.254 2.855 
 
Table C-3 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 26, which presents the 
Accuracy of the interference estimation algorithm.  
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Table C-3. Data for “accuracy of interference estimation algorithm” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) Accuracy deviation 
1 0.9401 0.024 
2 0.9328 0.02466 
3 0.9244 0.03014 
4 0.9267 0.03227 
5 0.8971 0.06148 
6 0.8863 0.07573 
7 0.88 0.07679 
8 0.8494 0.10942 
9 0.8403 0.11305 
 
Table C-4 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 27 (a), which presents the 
detection rate for our detection on DoQoS attacks. 
 
Table C-4. Data for “detection rate of DoQoS attacks” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
Detection 
rate deviation 
1 0.82647 0.07443 
2 0.81949 0.07091 
3 0.81386 0.07325 
4 0.81176 0.07267 
5 0.79733 0.08001 
6 0.79721 0.07748 
7 0.79705 0.07202 
8 0.77867 0.06959 
9 0.76029 0.06783 
 
Table C-5 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 27 (b), which presents the 
detection rate for the detection on QoS attacks. 
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Table C-5. Data for “detection rate of QoS attacks” 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
Detection 
rate deviation 
1 0.73213 0.023 
2 0.7359 0.0281 
3 0.73001 0.0296 
4 0.72624 0.0303 
5 0.72118 0.0299 
6 0.72127 0.0336 
7 0.69465 0.0439 
8 0.68597 0.0586 
9 0.66209 0.0607 
 
Table C-6 shows the data that we use to generate Figure 28, which presents the false 
positive rate of detection on DoQoS attacks. 
 
Table C-6. Data for “false positive rate of detection on DoQoS attacks” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Packet rate 
(pkt/sec) 
False positive 
rate Deviation 
1 0.26031 0.0177 
2 0.25995 0.0152 
3 0.25967 0.0168 
4 0.24654 0.017 
5 0.24603 0.0168 
6 0.24607 0.0154 
7 0.24062 0.0159 
8 0.22587 0.0157 
9 0.22355 0.0146 
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